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ABSTRACT 
Warning Confidence and Perceptions of Lava Flow Hazard Diversion Strategies at Kīlauea and 
Mauna Loa volcanos Hawai‘i 
by 
Ashleigh K. Reeves 
 
The 2014-15 lava flow crisis at Kīlauea volcano, Hawai‘i and post-September 2015 elevated 
unrest at adjacent Mauna Loa volcano provided opportunities to assess households’ 
psychological and behavioral responses to different levels of volcanic activity. We used the 
Protective Action Decision Model to examine stakeholder perceptions and confidence in 
warnings, in addition to attitudes toward lava flow mitigation strategies, such as diversion by 
berms and bombing, and people’s acceptance of additional risk to personal property in exchange 
for protecting important elements of their community, such as schools, major roads, electrical 
substation, and shopping centers. Respondents’ confidence in events important in decision-
making during emergencies and evacuations were significantly correlated with their past 
experience with lava forecasts. Consistent with previous studies, overall support for the two 
different mitigation measures was higher for earthen berms/trenches than it was for 
bombing/blasting. Finally, diversion acceptance was strongly correlated with residents’ 
perceptions of lava flow diversion strategies.  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
Hawai‘i Island is the youngest and largest island in the Hawaiian chain with three active and 
subaerially exposed volcanoes— Kīlauea volcano being the youngest and most active, followed 
by Mauna Loa and Hualālai. Kīlauea has erupted 34 times since 1952 A.D. and nearly 
continuously along its East Rift Zone (ERZ) since 1983 (USGS 1992, Gregg et al. 2008, Poland 
et al. 2015). Additionally, a vent opened in 2008 at Kīlauea’s summit crater—Halemaʻumaʻu, 
which hosts an active lava pond and a vigorous gas plume, resulting in the occurrence of dual 
eruptions from the ERZ and summit since that time. And at the time of preparation of this thesis 
in May 2018, dual eruptions are occurring along the lower ERZ and at the summit, with at least 
18 fissures opening in the former and explosions at the latter. Mauna Loa, in comparison, has 
erupted only two time since 1954 (in 1975 and 1984), although it has erupted 33 times since its 
first well-documented historical eruption in 1843. Mauna Loa’s most recent eruption occurred in 
1984 (Trusdell 2012). Hualālai is the least active of the three volcanoes and last erupted twice in 
ca. 1800-1801 (Kauahikaua and Camara, 2000). The island of Hawai‘i is also the fastest 
developing region in the State of Hawai‘i, spurred by having the most affordable land in the 
state, much of which is situated in areas of high lava flow hazard on Kīlauea and Mauna Loa. 
Such development in areas of high lava flow hazard on Kīlauea’s ERZ and downslope of Mauna 
Loa’s Southwest Rift Zone (SWRZ; Trusdell 1995) exacerbate risks from lava flow hazards on 
the island.  
While experiencing a population increase of twenty-four percent in the last decade, Hawaiʿi 
Island now has over 100,000 residents (United States Census Bureau 2010). And although 
population growth has occurred over several decades, the location of residential development has 
been largely confined to areas in the eastern and southern regions of the island—especially the 
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political districts of Puna, South Kona, and Kaʿū, while commercial development to support the 
visitor industry has largely occurred outside these areas on the west-central side of the island in 
North Kona district.  
Background 
Several eruptions of Kīlauea and Mauna Loa over the last ca. 100 years provided island 
residents and agencies with abundant and relatively recent lava flow hazard experience. Kīlauea 
provides the greatest experience, as several communities (e.g., Pāhoa, Kapoho, Royal Gardens 
and Kalapana) were all threatened or destroyed by lava since eruptions began occurring more 
frequently beginning in 1955 compared to the previous century. Kīlauea’s eruptions along the 
ERZ in 2014-2015 and beginning in May 2018 provide very recent experience, as hundreds to 
thousands of people have evacuated and dozens of structures destroyed. In contrast, Mauna Loa 
has only erupted three times since 1950 (1950, 1975 and 1984) and this greatly limits the 
experience of all stakeholders. This is a concern because of the higher effusion rates and steeper 
slopes, which contribute to higher lava flow front velocities and reduced early warning times 
compared to Kīlauea. People’s response to eruption and to the threat of eruption has largely 
involved evacuation and the bearing of both insured and uninsured losses. However, island 
residents and agencies have occasionally used structural diversion strategies to mitigate lava flow 
hazards and protect private, commercial and government property. Earthen barriers, bombs, and 
water have been the most common mitigation strategies for lava flows. However, decisions to 
use such mitigation strategies that interfere in the natural path of the lava flows may be based on 
expert scientific opinion, but public opposition has been reported to be sufficient to prevent lava 
mitigation (Hawai‘i State Civil Defense 2002). The recent activity at these two volcanoes—
eruption at Kīlauea and unrest at Mauna Loa, raises questions about how residents in risk areas 
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have viewed these threats, particularly how they view aspects of warnings, evacuations and lava 
diversion strategies . 
This thesis consists of two studies, both of which are discussed in further detail in the 
subsequent chapters: 
Study one. The goal of this study is to examine how differences in the characteristics of 
volcanic activity, topography, and histories of two active volcanoes affect five dependent 
variables—respondents’ protective actions, hazard information sources, perceptions of lava flow 
forecasts, stakeholder perceptions, and confidence in evacuation feasibility. This study also 
examines the influence of community bondedness, hazard zones, and demographic 
characteristics on the five dependent variables. The rationale for this approach stems from 
disaster research literature on protective action decision making, including the Protective Action 
Decision Model (PADM—Lindell and Perry 2012; Lindell 2017) and findings from research on 
Hawaiian populations (Murton and Shimabukuro 1974; Sorenson and Germehl 1980; Gregg et 
al. 2004a; Gregg et al. 2004b; Gregg et al. 2008).  
Study two. The goal of this study to understand public opinion about lava mitigation 
strategies such as diversion by berms or bombing— including the effectiveness of these 
mitigation strategies for lava flows and other hazards; their financial and legal considerations; 
and their requirements for specialized knowledge, skills and cooperation. People’s acceptance of 
additional risk to personal property in exchange for protecting important elements of their 
community such as schools, major roads, electrical substation, and shopping centers was also 
considered because of the disparity in how the residents responded to the use of different 
mitigation strategies during the 2014-2015 eruption. We evaluate these opinions about mitigation 
with crisis experience, hazard zonation, and perceptions of stakeholders. 
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CHAPTER 2  
ASSESSING WARNING CONFIDENCE AND PERCEPTIONS OF FORECASTING 
DURING VOLCANIC CRISIS AND UNREST AT KĪLAEA AND MAUNA LOA 
VOLCANOES, HAWAI‘I 
Abstract. The 2014-15 lava flow crisis at Kīlauea volcano, Hawai‘i and post-September 2015 
elevated unrest at adjacent Mauna Loa volcano provided opportunities to assess households’ 
psychological and behavioral responses to different levels of volcanic activity and uncertainty in 
the regions of variable lava flow hazard. The Kīlauea sample (N= 218) was asked about their 
perceptions of lava flow forecasts and response experiences to the United States Geological 
Survey’s Volcano Alert Level (VAL) — Warning (i.e., the highest level of alert in the United 
States VAL system), and Hawai‘i County Civil Defense Agency evacuation orders during the lava 
flow crisis, while the Mauna Loa sample (N= 203) was asked about perceptions of future forecasts 
and response to warnings and evacuations during the elevated period of unrest (i.e., increased from 
Normal to Advisory— two levels below Warning). We also examined how survey respondents 
perceived specific stakeholders— i.e., themselves and their families, their peers, news media, 
elected officials, and government agencies, with respect to characteristics of hazard expertise, 
trustworthiness, and protection responsibility. 
In general, we show that the relationship between respondents’ confidence in factors important 
in decision-making during emergencies and evacuations, such as receiving accurate lava flow 
forecasts and having time to prepare to evacuate, were most significantly correlated with the 
respondents’ past experience with lava forecasts. For example, the study found that residence in 
areas of high lava flow hazard correlated with increased perceptions of accurate lava flow 
forecasts— that is, those in high hazard zones closest to the source of eruptions were more likely 
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than their counterparts in areas of lower lava flow hazards to believe the United States Geological 
Survey would issue accurate lava forecasts. 
1. Introduction  
Development of land in areas of high lava flow hazards on Kīlauea and Mauna Loa volcanoes, 
Hawai‘i (Fig. 2.1) has increased significantly over the last few decades (Trusdell, 1995; Poland et 
al, 2015). The United States Geological Survey (USGS), Hawaiian Volcano Observatory (HVO) 
monitors volcano and seismic hazards on the island and issues warning-related messages 
(Sorensen and Gersmehl, 1980) through the Volcano Alert Level System (VAL/VALS; Ewert, 
Guffanti and Murray, 2005). County, State and Federal offices use VALs— Normal, Advisory, 
Watch and Warning, established by HVO to make decisions concerning evacuation and other 
emergency responses. Similarly, other stakeholders use the VALs and eruption and lava flow 
forecasts to prioritize risk reduction activities. Here, we describe the results of sample survey 
research of residents’ perceptions of specific stakeholders and beliefs about lava forecasts and 
warnings and evacuations. The study is framed around resident experiences on Kīlauea and Mauna 
Loa. 
 15 
 
Figure 2.1: Location of volcanoes in study area (Kīlauea, Mauna Loa, Hualālai) and rift zones 
(Kīlauea’s East Rift Zone (ERZ) and Mauna Loa’s Southwest Rift Zone (SWRZ)) on the island of 
Hawai‘i, major roads, and USGS designated lava flow hazard zones. Inset map shows elevation 
and the location of volcanoes in the study area again for reference. 
 Kīlauea has been in a near continuous state of eruption since 1983 (Poland et al., 2015; Heliker 
et al., 2003), but on June 27, 2014 a new vent opened and allowed lava to slowly flow toward 
developed areas in the district of Puna on the eastern end of the island. The event evolved into an 
emergency on August 22, 2014 when the USGS HVO issued a press release stating, "Kīlauea lava 
flow northeast of Pu‘u ‘Ō‘ō a potential concern"  (USGS, 2014). This coincided with recovery 
efforts related to a major hurricane that struck the southern half of the island as Tropical Storm 
Iselle (Kimberlain et al., 2014) just two weeks earlier. With residents still recovering from the 
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impacts of Iselle, schools and businesses closed, residents evacuated, and alternate roads were 
graded at great expense in preparation for the arrival of lava (see Poland et al, 2016).  
The 2014-15 lava flow crisis ended with minimal direct damage caused by actual lava 
encroachment and inundation on structures, but considerable economic impacts were borne out by 
responses to the threat of inundation and isolation by lava. The threat of isolation and inundation 
meant residents’ needed to take action to evacuate or relocate belongings. By late March 2015, 
breakouts upslope diverted lava away from the flow front, so HVO downgraded the VAL from 
Warning to Watch, signifying the immediate threat was over, although a moratorium put into place 
on property insurance would not be lifted for several months.  The moratorium meant residents’ 
were unable to purchase or increase property insurance. Three months after the moratorium was 
lifted in June, HVO issued a press release in September 2015 (USGS, 2015) indicating they were 
raising the VAL from Normal to Advisory at nearby Mauna Loa due to increases in unrest 
indicators above known background levels. While there was no imminent threat of an eruption, 
HVO interpreted the unrest to indicate an increasing likelihood of an eruption on the volcano’s 
southwest rift zone (SWRZ), which, along with Kīlauea’s East Rift Zone (ERZ), comprise areas 
of high lava flow hazard and increasing residential and commercial development.  
While Kīlauea lava flows provided recent experience with responding to lava flow forecasts 
and evacuations, Mauna Loa had not erupted since 1984, and not along the SWRZ since 1950, so 
there is limited social and agency experience with Mauna Loa eruptions. Lava flows from both 
volcanoes have both advanced at variable rates, but in general, the lower effusion rates and slopes 
on Kīlauea contribute to slower advance rates that at Mauna Loa, while higher effusion rates and 
steep slopes on Mauna Loa contribute to faster flows. In both places, residential subdivisions are 
located on and down slope of the rift zones, exacerbating volcanic risk. The threat of fast lava 
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flows on Mauna Loa’s SWRZ and eruption sources near developed areas could affect nearby 
populations in short time periods. One additional concern for residents residing near Mauna Loa’s 
SWRZ is that indirect experience with Kīlauea’s slower moving lava flows, and lack of any 
experience in Ka‘ū and South Kona since 1950, could prompt residents to develop similar 
expectations for lava flow forecasts, warnings, and evacuations. 
Residential development has been largely confined to the Puna District on the eastern flank of 
Kīlauea and to the districts of Ka‘ū and S Kona on the south flank of Mauna Loa (Fig. 2.2 & Fig. 
2.3). Increasing population and development in these areas is spurred by the presence of the most 
affordable land in the state in areas situated in high lava flow hazard zones. Murton and 
Shimabukaro (1974) reported that while some household and business hazard adjustments 
included evacuation of personal and private property from eruptions of Kīlauea, the bearing of 
losses was the most common adjustment, meaning that evacuation and acceptance of losses due to 
lava flows were the most common response.  
 18 
 
Figure 2.2: Map showing the Puna district (outlined in white) as well as nearby towns and residential 
subdivisions. This map highlights 20th and 21st century lava flows for Kīlauea in gray and the 
recent 2014 lava flow in red.  
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Figure 2.3: Map showing the Kaʿū, South Kona, and North Kona districts (outlined in white) as well as 
nearby towns and residential subdivisions. This map highlights 20th century lava flows for Mauna 
Loa in gray.   
The on-going unrest at Mauna Loa and the recent crisis at Kīlauea raises questions about how 
residents in these risk areas view these events. The goal of this study is therefore to examine how 
differences in the characteristics of volcanic activity, topography, and histories of these two 
volcanoes affect five dependent variables—respondents’ protective actions, hazard information 
sources, perceptions of lava flow forecasts, stakeholder perceptions, and confidence in evacuation 
feasibility. We also examine the influence of community bondedness (i.e., sense of community), 
hazard zone, and demographic characteristics on the five dependent variables. The rationale for 
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this approach stems from disaster research literature on protective action decision making, 
including the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM—Lindell, 2017; Lindell and Perry, 2012) 
and findings from research on Hawaiian populations (Gregg et al., 2008; Gregg et al., 2004a; 
Gregg et al., 2004b; Sorenson and Gersmehl, 1980; Murton and Shimabukuro, 1974). 
 
2. Theoretical Background  
The communication of information about complex processes such as volcanic activity (e.g., 
timing, direction, intensity, duration, etc.) is characterized by considerable uncertainty over time. 
Focusing on how people consider and interpret uncertainty is useful because it represents a 
common factor in how people experience the hazardous environments in which they are being 
asked to make mitigation and preparedness decisions (Paton, 2013). Uncertainty is evident, for 
example, in predicting when a hazardous event will occur, where it will occur, what the magnitude 
and intensity of the event will be, and its impacts, and how long those impacts will last (Paton and 
McClure, 2013). People can sometimes find it difficult to readily clarify the uncertainties 
associated with hazards and what the most effective measures are that they can implement to 
protect themselves from hazard-related consequences (Paton and McClure, 2013).  
Much is known about human response to warnings at the individual and family level and at the 
emergency warning organizational level (Drabek, 1986). Warning response involves a sequence 
of cognitive and behavioral steps, which Mileti and Sorensen (1990) characterized as the sequence 
of hearing the warning, understanding the contents of the warning message, believing the warning 
is credible and accurate, personalizing the warning to oneself, confirming that the warning is true 
and that others are taking notice, and responding by adopting protective action recommendations. 
Weinstein (1989) concluded that perceived personal risk is related to the recency, frequency, and 
intensity of people’s personal experience with hazard events—a finding supported more recently 
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by Lindell and Prater (2000). Direct hazard experience can increase people’s preparedness, but 
people can normalize their experiences with relatively minor events and equate those experiences 
to future events of greater magnitude or intensity (Johnston et al., 1999). Such “false experience” 
(Baker, 1991) leads people to believe that the worst they have experienced is the worst they can 
experience. Paton et al. (2008) found that this “normalization bias” can result in people’s 
overestimation of their perceived preparedness and perceived need to prepare. Moreover, people 
who are farther from hazard sources are less likely to have direct experience with hazard impacts 
and, for that reason, tend to have lower levels of perceived personal risk (Lindell and Hwang, 
2008).  
2.1 Information Sources. Lindell and Perry (2012) state that information-seeking occurs when 
there is some degree of uncertainty at a given stage in the PADM. When people lack answers to 
questions about a hazardous event or protective actions and they think that there is time available 
to find answers to those questions before protective actions have to be taken, they cope with the 
uncertainty by searching for additional information (Perry et al., 1981; Perry and Greene, 1983; 
Hanson et al., 1979). Among other factors, the perceived credibility of the warning source can 
influence the time the person spends seeking and processing information rather than taking 
protective action (Perry et al., 1981; Perry and Greene, 1983). It is important to note that during 
the 2014-15 lava crisis multiple islands and newspapers ran stories concerning the crisis and the 
Hawai‘i Civil Defense made routine daily updates. There were also a variety of Facebook and 
other social media sites that many residents’ used as a source for information.  
2.2 Stakeholder Perceptions. People confronted with complex issues that they poorly 
understand, such as volcanic hazards, generally rely on experts for hazard information and hold 
them responsible for protection from the hazard (Gregg et al., 2003). Arlikatti et al. (2007) and 
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Birkmann et al. (2008) defined the term stakeholder to include individuals and organizations that 
people perceive to have a role in coping with a threat. For this study, the term stakeholder consists 
of people ranging from the general population to elected and appointed officials in federal to local 
government.  
Hazard agencies, such as the HVO, generate information about volcano and seismic hazards 
on the island of Hawai‘i (e.g., see USGS, 1992) and disseminate it directly to people residing in 
risk areas or make it available through multiple channels. They do this by posting information on 
their website and through other forms of communication with state and local agencies, the news 
media, and the general public. They also routinely present information orally and in the printed 
press. In 2014, they played a key role in Civil Defense’s community meetings during the 2014-
2015 Kīlauea lava flow crisis.  
Arlikatti et al. (2007) concluded that peers, officials, and media are typically evaluated on three 
characteristics: expertise (technical knowledge of the hazard), trustworthiness (accuracy and 
completeness of information communicated about the situation), and protection responsibility. 
Stakeholders have the potential to make contributions to the interpretative processes people use to 
make sense of uncertain hazardous circumstances. Trust binds stakeholders and community 
members in ways that facilitates actions under conditions of uncertainty (Paton, 2013).  
As hazard uncertainty increases, many people increase their reliance on official sources of 
information to cope because their past experiences have led them to trust and believe in those 
sources to provide information (Lindell and Perry, 1992; Paton, 2008; Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 
2000). Perceived trustworthiness is an important predictor of protective action decision making; 
for instance, lava flows are often hidden from view so people had to trust USGS and Civil Defense 
about a hazard that they could not clearly see for themselves. Previous studies have shown that 
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stakeholders differ significantly in perceived expertise, trustworthiness, and protection 
responsibility, and that these characteristics have significant positive correlations with hazard 
adjustment intentions and actual adjustment adoption (Arlikatti et al., 2007; Lindell and Whitney, 
2000). People’s willingness to use information to guide their actions under conditions of 
uncertainty can be influenced by the degree to which they trust the source of information (Paton, 
2013). Other studies suggested that communicating uncertainty can decrease people’s trust in and 
credibility of the source, and that can allow people to justify inaction or to perceive risk as being 
higher or lower than it is, to be consistent with their pre-existing beliefs (Johnson and Slovic, 1985, 
1998; Miles and Frewer, 2003; Smithson, 1999; Wiedemann, 2008).  
2.3 Warning Confidence. Extensive research has revealed much about how people react and 
respond to hazard warnings (Cutter and Barnes, 1982; Drabek, 1969; Paton et al., 2006; Sorensen, 
2000; Sorensen and Mileti, 1988; Sorensen and Vogt-Sorenson, 2007). The decision to either “wait 
and see” or act as if there is “no time to lose” is not just dependent on the scenario; forecast content 
and format, and people’s decision-making concerns. It is also dependent on their prior perceptions 
of the potential outcomes of a period of volcanic unrest and their perceptions of the likelihood of 
an event throughout the time during which an eruption or inundation is expected or forecasted 
(Doyle et al., 2014).  
The immediacy of a threat is important because warning recipients must understand that the 
message describes an event whose consequences are likely to occur in the very near future. People 
tend to initiate activities such as information seeking and expedient property protection when they 
believe there is more time available before impact than the minimum necessary to implement 
protective action (Lindell et al., 2015; Perry and Greene, 1983; Perry et al., 1981; Sorensen, 1991). 
The actual implementation of protective action depends not only on a person’s intentions to take 
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those actions but also on those conditions in their physical and social environment that can impede 
actions that they would have otherwise taken (Triandis, 1980). Perry et al. (1981) found that in 
most cases the gap between evacuation intentions and behavior at Mount St. Helens seemed to be 
caused by impediments rather than unexpected facilitators; there are many instances in which 
people have wanted to evacuate but lacked a safe place to go, a safe route to travel, or a personal 
vehicle and limited mobility due to physical disabilities (Heath et al., 2001; Van Willigen et al., 
2002).  
2.4 Forecast Accuracy. The communication of advice about complex processes whose activity 
(i.e., arrival timing, direction, intensity, duration, etc.) is characterized by considerable uncertainty 
over time is a global issue. And despite the study of volcanic precursors and eruptions over the 
past century, it is still not possible to predict the precise time, place, or magnitude of volcanic 
events, and this uncertainty increases significantly with increasing time before the onset of 
eruption. During the June 2014-15 lava crisis, HVO made lava flow forecasts to estimate the arrival 
time of lava in specific areas downslope of the flow front, but forecasting became rather difficult 
with the lava flow front advancing, stalling and widening, and then becoming inactive due to the 
fluctuating supply of lava from the source vent and breakdowns in the lava tube (Poland et al., 
2015). Measured advance rates of the lava flow front were used to provide a range of potential 
arrival times at important areas downslope of the flow front. Such information was subsequently 
used by authorities and residents downslope to prioritize responses. Residents’ and agencies 
needed to know lava arrival time in order to set their priorities. There was certainly time available 
at Kīlauea to evacuate but some communities on the ERZ were at greater risk because the area 
could potentially be the source of a future eruption. Also it is important to note, Mauna Loa 
eruptions happen quickly so it would make sense for people to differ in this regard based on the 
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whether they live near Mauna Loa or Kīlauea volcano. This survey aims to answer a very important 
question regarding forecasting accuracy and that is— how accurate do residents believe lava 
forecasts were at Kīlauea during the 2014-15 lava crisis and also how do they perceive future 
forecasts at Mauna Loa?  
2.5 Community Bondedness. Paton et al. (2001) found a significant correlation between 
people’s sense of community and the level of support for hazard management strategies. Barberi 
et al. (2008) also reported a relatively high mean level near Vesuvius was positively correlated 
with important risk factors (e.g., household and government preparedness, confidence in the 
evacuation plan, and receipt of information about volcanic hazards). Similar results were found 
for residents near Campi Flegrei (Ricci et al., 2013; Davis et al., 2006). Wei and Lindell (2017) 
reported that community bondedness significantly predicted household emergency and evacuation 
preparedness at Mt. Rainier. 
2.6 Hazard Proximity. Proximity to hazard sources affects respondents’ risk perceptions via 
their personal experience with hazardous events and higher levels of information dissemination to 
those in areas of highest risk (Lindell and Hwang, 2008).  
2.7 Research Objective. This study examined the relationship between respondents’ 
confidence in events important in decision-making during an imminent lava threat including: a) 
confidence in the accuracy of lava arrival forecasts, b) that an official warning would be received 
before a hazard arrives at their location, c) that they would have time to prepare to evacuate, and 
d) that they would have the ability to evacuate to a safe location once a lava flow begins but before 
their home is threatened. We also assessed their past hazard experience and used a Geographical 
Information System to evaluate the spatial distribution of households across the island’s lava flow 
hazard zones (USGS 1992). Because the June 27 lava flow advanced at a fairly slow rate (from 0 
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to 500 m day-1), residents in the highest hazard zones may overestimate the amount of time 
available to prepare in future lava flow scenarios, which could have much higher flow rates during 
other eruptions of both Kīlauea and Mauna Loa.   
This study also investigated the correlation between stakeholder perceptions and respondents’ 
confidence in warnings, as Lindell and Perry (2012) suggested that respondents’ who viewed other 
stakeholders as more knowledgeable and trustworthy, and as having more personal responsibility 
to protect themselves from environmental hazards, are more likely to take protective action than 
those without these views. Whether protective actions are taken can sometimes be facilitated or 
impeded by a person’s access to resources; therefore this study examined the influence of the 
respondents’ sense of belonging to the community and demographic characteristics on their 
perceptions of stakeholders and confidence in warnings.  
3. Materials and Methods  
3.1 Survey Procedure. Data were collected from adult residents (18 years and older) in areas 
on Kīlauea and Mauna Loa using two nearly identical household survey questionnaires distributed 
equally to 800 people on each volcano between April and July 2017. The questionnaires were 
modelled after those used by Greene et al. (1981), Perry and Greene (1983), Lindell and Whitney 
(2000), Davis et al. (2006), Perry and Lindell (2008), Apatu et al. (2015), and Wei and Lindell 
(2017). The 1600 households were randomly selected and spatially distributed across three lava 
flow hazard zones (USGS 1992) on the east side of Kīlauea and four zones on the southern side of 
Mauna Loa. Following Dillman’s (2000) Tailored Design Method, each household was sent an 
initial questionnaire, cover letter and self-addressed, postage paid return envelope beginning on 
March 15. Non-respondents were subsequently sent a reminder postcard and as many as two 
replacement questionnaire packages. Recruitment was terminated on July 4. Some 138 (8.6%) 
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packets were undeliverable and only one packet was refused. A total of 421 households returned 
usable questionnaires for a response rate of deliverable packets 29% (15% from Kīlauea and 14% 
from Mauna Loa; see Table 2.1). The study was approved by ETSU’s Institutional Review Board 
(c0117.9sd). 
Table 2.1: Total response rate for each hazard zone for Kīlauea and Mauna Loa volcanoes 
Site; Hazard Zone Percent Count (N) 
1. Kīlauea; Highest 2.2 8 
2. Kīlauea; Moderate 14.2 53 
3. Kīlauea; Lowest 39.8 148 
4. Mauna Loa; Highest 14.0 52 
5. Mauna Loa; Moderate 19.4 72 
6. Mauna Loa; Lowest 10.5 39 
 
3.2 Measures. 
3.2.1 Dependent variables. The five dependent variables assessed in this study included— 
protective actions taken; information sources sought; information sources through which 
information was received; perceptions of stakeholders as trustworthy, knowledgeable (i.e., 
experts) and responsible for protecting the population; confidence in warnings and response; and 
perceptions of the accuracy of lava flow forecasts. Many people in lower Puna needed to take 
action to evacuate or relocate belongings, house contents, valuables, etc. due to the potential threat 
of isolation during the 2014-15 lava flow crisis.  
Regarding protective actions taken in response to the crisis, Kīlauea respondents were asked 
“Did the June 2014-2015 lava flow crisis in Puna cause you to do any of the following due to 
concerns about the safety of yourself, your family, or your property?” Similarly, Mauna Loa 
respondents were asked “Has the increased volcano unrest at Mauna Loa since September 2015 
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caused you to do any of the following due to concerns about the safety of yourself, your family or 
your property.” Specific protective actions were: a) prepare to evacuate your home; b) actually 
evacuate your home; c) prepare to put your home up for sale; d) actually put your home up for 
sale; e) review homeowner or renter insurance with respect to lava or fire; and f) try to either 
purchase or increase your property insurance. All six items were rated No (=1) or Yes (=2). 
Questions about information sources addressed the 2014-15 lava crisis.  We asked Kīlauea 
respondents: “How many community-wide meetings about lava flow hazard did you attend during 
the June 2014-2015 lava flow crisis in Puna?” The response options available were: None, 1-2, 3-
4, 5-6, 7-8, and 9 or more. The responses were highly skewed so they were coded into “Attended 
meetings” (= 1) and “Did not attend meetings” (= 0). There was no similar question asked of 
Mauna Loa respondents because they would not have reasonably attended the community 
meetings for the Kīlauea crisis and there were no equivalent meetings for them during the unrest. 
We asked all respondents about the extent to which they received information through specific 
channels from other stakeholders. For the Kīlauea respondents, we asked: “To what extent did you 
receive information about the June 2014-2015 lava flow crisis in Puna from the following?” For 
the Mauna Loa sample, the question was as follows: “In September 2015, the USGS Hawaiian 
Volcano Observatory raised the Volcano Alert Level at Mauna Loa from Normal to Advisory 
because of signs of unrest above background levels. To what extent have you received information 
about this volcano unrest from...” The response options (i.e., channels through which information 
was received) were: a) radio on-air broadcasts; b) television on-air broadcasts; c) newspaper print 
editions; d) websites of radio stations, TV stations, or newspapers; e) the US Geological Survey 
Hawai’i Volcano Observatory website; f) the Hawai‘i Civil Defense website; and g) social media. 
The items were all rated on a five-point Likert scale from “Not at all” (= 1) to “Very great extent” 
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(=5). Based on a factor analysis of the responses, the items were used to form two scales—
“traditional media” (calculated using the mean scores of radio on-air broadcasts, television on-air 
broadcasts, newspaper print editions, and websites of radio or TV stations, or newspapers; α = .81) 
and “new media” (calculated using the mean scores of the USGS HVO website, Hawai‘i Civil 
Defense website, and social media; α = .80).  
Lastly, we asked respondents to rate other stakeholder groups with respect to three 
characteristics—their hazard knowledge (i.e., expertise), their trustworthiness and their 
responsibility for protecting the population. The stakeholder groups were—federal, state, and local 
agencies; media; state and local officials; peers; and their immediate family. Respondents from 
Kīlauea were asked to rate the stakeholders in the context of Kīlauea, while respondents on Mauna 
Loa were asked to rate stakeholders with respect to Mauna Loa. The characteristics were, more 
specifically: 1) hazard expertise: “To what extent do you think the following individuals or 
organizations are knowledgeable about Kīlauea [cf. Mauna Loa] lava flows?”; 2) trustworthiness: 
“To what extent do you think each of the following is willing to provide you with accurate 
information about Kīlauea [cf. Mauna Loa] lava flows?”; and 3) protection responsibility: “To 
what extent do you think each of following is responsible for protecting you from Kīlauea [cf. 
Mauna Loa] lava flows?” These items were all anchored by a five-point Likert scale from “Not at 
all” (=1) to “Very great extent” (=5). Based on the results of a factor analysis that identified five 
factors, three scales were created using the mean scores of: a) stakeholders (federal, state, and local 
agencies, state and local elected officials) based on their perceived trustworthiness (Cronbach’s α 
= .91); b) based on their perceived expertise (α = .92); and c) based on their perceived protection 
responsibility (α = .95). In addition, two scales were created using the mean scores of: d) 
government agencies (federal, state, and local agencies) based on their perceived trustworthiness 
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and expertise (α = .92); and e) the respondents themselves, their immediate family, and their peers 
based on their perceived trustworthiness, expertise, and protection responsibility (α = .82).  
Respondents were also asked to indicate their confidence in four aspects of warnings and 
response to future volcanic activity: “How likely do you think it is that each of the following will 
happen after a lava flow begins but before your home is threatened: a) you will receive an accurate 
forecast of lava arrival time, b) you will receive an official evacuation warning, c) you can prepare 
to evacuate, and d) you can prepare to evacuate to a safe location?” These items were all anchored 
by a five-point Likert scale from “Extremely unlikely” (=1) to “Extremely likely” (=5) and 
averaged to create a scale with α = .87.  
Additionally, people’s perceptions of the accuracy of previous lava flow forecasts at Kīlauea 
and future forecasts at Mauna Loa were evaluated by asking the Kīlauea sample: “How accurate 
do you think the lava flow forecasts during the June 2014-2015 lava flow crisis in Puna were with 
respect to...” For the Mauna Loa sample, we asked: “How accurate do you think lava flow forecasts 
will be during any future eruption of Mauna Loa with respect to…” Response options were: a) 
locations to be affected, b) amount of lava expected at those locations, and c) time at which lava 
would arrive at those locations. Scale scores were created from the mean of the three items (within 
a respondent) being computed and then analyzed over respondents.  
3.2.2 Independent variables. Respondents were asked to rate their sense of community, which 
has also been described as community bondedness (Turner et al., 1986; Wei and Lindell, 2017). 
Specifically, respondents were asked, “To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements: (a) I feel like I belong in this community, (b) I believe my neighbors would 
help me in an emergency, (c) Even if I had the opportunity I would not move out of this community, 
(d) I feel loyal to the people in my community, (e) I often have friends over at my house to see me, 
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(f) I plan to remain a resident of this community for a number of years. The items were all rated 
on a five-point Likert scale from “Strongly disagree” (= 1) to “Strongly agree” (= 5). These items 
were averaged to create a scale with α = .83.  
Our study areas comprised households in USGS lava flow hazard Zones 1-4 and 6, although 
the few respondents (N = 41) in Zone 4 are actually located just off the flank of Mauna Loa and 
on the southwest flank of Hūalalai (Fig. 2.1). The inclusion of these households was an artifact of 
sampling from PO Box zip codes.  Zone 4 is restricted to Hūalalai where eruptions are less frequent 
than at Mauna Loa and Kīlauea. Zone 1 only includes the summits and two rift zones of Kīlauea 
and Mauna Loa where vents have been repeatedly active in historical times. Zone 2 includes land 
adjacent to and immediately downslope from Zone 1. Zone 3 is less hazardous than Zone 2 because 
of greater distance from recently active vents or because topography reduces the hazard, or both. 
High topography reduces two other zones—Zone 5 on Kīlauea and Zone 6 on Mauna Loa. There 
was no need to recode respondents living in Kīlauea lava flow Zones 1, 2, and 3, but we recoded 
the Mauna Loa Zones 1 and 2 as 1, Zone 3 as 2, and Zones 4 and 6 as 3. Recoding provided three 
levels of lava flow hazard for each sample. 
To assess respondents’ demographic characteristics, we asked their marital status: married, 
single, divorced, or widowed (coded as “married” = 1 and “not married” = 0). Respondents were 
also asked, “How many people in your household are: Less than 18 years, 18-65 years, over 65 
years” (added to compute the total number of people in the household). Respondents were asked 
to describe their yearly household income before taxes: less than $25,000 (= 1), $25,001-$50,000 
(= 2), $50,001-$75,000 (= 3), $75,001-$100,000 (= 4), or over $100,000 (= 5), and their highest 
level of education attained: elementary school (grades 1-6 = 1), Junior High or Middle School 
(grades 7-8 = 2), High School (grades 9-12 = 3), College Degree (2 or 4 year degree = 4), or 
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Graduate Degree (= 5). We also asked their ethnicity: Caucasian, Native American, African 
American, Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander, Mixed, and Other (coded as “white” = 1 and “non-
white” = 0).  
3.3 Statistical Analysis. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to assess the differences 
among the respondents residing in the three lava flow hazard zones on Kīlauea and Mauna Loa 
volcanoes with respect to their perceptions of stakeholders, warning confidence, past hazard 
experience, community bondedness, and demographic characteristics (i.e., sex, age, income, 
education, ethnicity, marital status, and household size). Pearson correlations were used to assess 
the degree of association among the independent and dependent variables. The experiment-wise 
error rate was controlled by setting a conservative significance level of p ≤ .01. All analyses were 
conducted in SPSS Version 23 and ArcGIS 10.4.  
4. Results  
4.1 Differences by Volcano and Hazard Zone. The results for Kīlauea respondents’ attendance 
at community meetings during the 2014-15 lava flow crisis by hazard zone are presented in Table 
2.2, which shows that there were significant differences among hazard zones (𝜒𝜒32 = 15.6, p < .001). 
Specifically, respondents in the lowest hazard zone (i.e., zone 3 on Kīlauea, which has a lower 
hazard rating than zone 2) had a significantly lower percentage of attendance than those in the 
moderate hazard zone (total responses from the highest hazard zone were too low to draw 
meaningful conclusions).  
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Table 2.2: Community meeting attendance during the June 2014-15 lava crisis at Kīlauea 
volcano. 
Assigned 
Hazard Zone 
USGS Lava Flow 
Hazard Zone 
Did not attend 
meetings  Attended meetings  
High 1 4 (50%) 4 (50%) 
Moderate 2 21 (41.2%) 30 (58.8%) 
Low 3 96 (65.3%) 51 (34.7%) 
 
There were no statistically significant differences between Kīlauea and Mauna Loa on the 
respondents’ demographic characteristics or on the proportions of respondents who prepared for 
evacuation (0.25 vs. 0.16) or implemented evacuation (0.02 vs. 0.05), prepared to sell their homes 
(0.04 vs. 0.04), actually put them up for sale (0.01 vs. 0.02), reviewed insurance (0.37 vs. 0.15), 
or purchased or increased insurance coverage (0.03 vs. 0.02) as indicated by Table 2.3.  
Table 2.3: Mean ratings for response actions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4 shows that all stakeholders received mean ratings above the rating scale midpoint (3 
on a scale of 1-5) except peers on protection responsibility (M = 2.90). With respect to expertise, 
there is a clear hierarchy from federal agencies to peers and state elected officials. Respondents 
rated themselves and their families as being as knowledgeable as the news media (t402 = -1.88, ns) 
but less knowledgeable than government agencies (t404 = 3.75, p < .01). Roughly the same rank 
order is found with respect to ratings of trustworthiness, except that peers are considered to be 
more trustworthy than local elected officials (t402 = 8.23, p < .01). All government agencies are 
Variables Kīlauea Mauna Loa 
1. Prepared for evacuation 1.25 1.16 
2. Implemented evacuation 1.02 1.05 
3. Prepared to sell their home 1.04 1.04 
4. Actually put their home up for sale 1.01 1.02 
5. Reviewed insurance 1.37 1.15 
6. Tried to purchase or increase insurance 
coverage 1.03 1.02 
 34 
considered to be equally trustworthy and both types of elected officials are considered to be equally 
trustworthy. Respondents rated their families as being as trustworthy as the news media (t404 = 
0.53, ns) but less trustworthy than government agencies (t403 = 5.87, p < .01). Finally, there is a 
similar rank order for protection responsibility, with all government agencies considered to be 
equally responsible and the news media and both types of elected officials considered to be equally 
responsible. Respondents rated themselves and their families as having significantly higher 
protection responsibility than other stakeholders (t403 = 9.35, p < .01).  
Table 2.4: Ratings of stakeholders on expertise, trustworthiness, and protection responsibility 
(Mean and standard error of mean). 
Stakeholder Expertise Trustworthiness Protection Responsibility 
FedAgen 4.40 ± .05 4.35 ± .05a 3.72 ± .07a 
StatAgen 4.16 ± .05 4.30 ± .05a 3.81 ± .07a 
LocAgen 4.06 ± .05 4.18 ± .05 3.76 ± .07a 
NewsMedia  3.52 ± .06 3.90 ± .06 3.07 ± .08b 
StateElecOff 3.15 ± .06 3.42 ± .06b 3.12 ± .08b 
LocElecOff 3.40 ± .06 3.56 ± .06b 3.19 ± .08b 
Peers 3.13 ± .06 3.71 ± .06 2.90 ± .07 
Self/family2 3.64 ± .06 3.88 ± .06 4.04 ± .07 
Note: Adjacent stakeholders have statistically significant differences unless designated by a common superscript. 
*Family but not self was rated for trustworthiness. 
 
4.2 Correlation Analysis. Results from the correlation analysis are presented in Table 2.5. The 
correlation analysis yielded an average r = 0.01 of the demographic characteristics with the 
remaining variables. Among the 108 correlations of the eight demographic variables with 18 other 
variables, only five were statistically significant (p < .01). This 5% statistical significance rate is 
only slightly larger than the 1% that would be expected by chance, but there was a somewhat 
consistent pattern in that three of the significant correlations were of ethnicity with government 
protection responsibility, self/peer expertise/trustworthiness, and reliance on traditional media (r 
= 0.14, 0.13, and 0.19, respectively). 
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In contrast to demographics, community bondedness had significant correlations with 
perceptions of government expertise, government trustworthiness (r = 0.27 and 0.19, respectively), 
self/peers expertise/trustworthiness (r = 0.24), and warning confidence (r = 0.19). Volcano site 
(Mauna Loa = 1) had a marginal correlation with self/peers expertise and trustworthiness (r = -
0.15), but not any of the other stakeholder characteristics. Volcano site also had significant 
correlations with government trustworthiness (r = 0.19), expertise/trust in news media (r = 0.24), 
and confidence in warnings (r = 0.19). Neither community bondedness nor volcano site had any 
significant correlations with response actions (average r = -0.01). Hazard zone had significant 
correlations with both information sources, traditional media and new media (r = -0.22 and -0.25, 
respectively). Hazard zone also had significant correlations with self/peers, 
expertise/trustworthiness (r = -0.15), and forecasting accuracy (r = -0.14).  
Perceptions of government expertise and government trustworthiness were highly correlated 
with each other (r = 0.71) and both were moderately correlated with perceptions of protection 
responsibility (r = 0.41 and 0.39, respectively). Moreover, government ratings on all three 
characteristics were strongly correlated with ratings of self/peers expertise/trustworthiness (r = 
0.50, 0.54, and 0.45, respectively). The three government stakeholder characteristics and self/peer 
expertise/trustworthiness were also strongly correlated with warning confidence (r = 0.61, 0.55, 
0.31, and 0.34, respectively), perceived forecast accuracy (r = 0.46, 0.44, 0.24, and 0.28, 
respectively), and utilization of traditional media (r = 0.35, 0.32, 0.17, and 0.30, respectively). All 
stakeholder characteristics except government protection responsibility were significantly 
correlated with utilization of new media (r = 0.33, 0.34, 0.11, and 0.29, respectively) and none of 
the stakeholder characteristics were significantly correlated with meeting attendance (average r = 
0.08) or with response actions (average r = 0.03).  
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Forecast accuracy was significantly correlated with warning confidence (r = 0.48) and both 
were correlated with traditional media (r = 0.28 and 0.38, respectively) and new media (r = 0.26 
and 0.33, respectively), but not meeting attendance (r = 0.10 and 0.10, respectively). Moreover, 
only forecast accuracy was significantly correlated with any of the response actions (insurance 
review r = 0.17). Meeting attendance had significant correlations with traditional media (r = 0.56), 
as well as evacuation preparations and insurance review (r = 0.21 and 0.23, respectively), and 
insurance review was also significantly correlated with traditional media and new media (r = 0.17 
and 0.24, respectively).  
Finally, the response actions tended to be significantly correlated with each other. Most 
notably, those who prepared to evacuate or sell their homes were more likely to evacuate or put 
their homes on the market (r = 0.32 and 0.56, respectively), as well as to review their insurance 
coverage or purchase more insurance (evacuation preparation: r = 0.36 and 0.18, respectively; sale 
preparation: r = 0.20 and 0.28, respectively).
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Table 2.5: Means (M), Standard deviations (SD), and correlations (rij) among variables. 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
  1. Gender 0.50 0.50 -                               
  2. Age 61.71 12.04 -.21 -                             
  3. Ethnicity 0.63 0.48 -.09 .15 -                           
  4. Income 2.56 1.30 .00 -.11 .00 -                         
  5. Married 0.59 0.49 -.03 -.02 -.03 .37 -                       
  6. HHSize 2.24 1.51 .08 -.28 -.19 .20 .33 -                     
  7. CommBond 3.91 0.87 .05 .07 -.09 .01 .13 .14 -                   
  8. Volcano 0.48 0.50 -.02 -.03 -.01 .03 -.01 .07 -.06 -                 
  9. HazardZone 2.07 1.03 -.05 -.06 .02 -.08 -.04 .03 -.12 -.50 -         
 10. AnyMeet 0.40 0.49 -.09 .00 .19 .05 .06 .04 .08 -.01 -.01 -        
11. TradMedia 2.87 1.30 .07 .04 -.18 -.06 -.01 -.01 .11 -.22 .27 -.03 -        
12. NewMedia 2.71 1.36 .09 -.13  -.05 .00 .00 -.02 .12 -.25 .14 .17 .56 -      
13. GovtExpert 3.82 0.94 .04 .01 -.05 -.01 .06 .08 .27 -.10 .14 .05 .35 .33 -        
14. GovtTrust 3.97 0.95 .02 -.02 .01 .02 -.01 .07 .19 -.09 .12 .08 .32 .34 .71 -      
15. GovtProResp 3.53 1.34 .11 -.05 -.16 .02 .06 .09 .11 -.01 -.01 .10 .17 .11 .41 .39 -    
16. NewsExpTr 3.70 1.03 .01 .02 -.13 -.05 .01 .08 .24 -.09 .11 .07 .38 .23 .78 .74 .42 -  
17. Self/peers 3.56 0.95 .05 -.01 -.12 -.03 .04 .11 .24 -.15 .08 .07 .30 .29 .50 .54 .45 .54 - 
18. WarnConf 4.05 1.00 -.05 .03 .04 .05 .07 .01 .19 -.10 .15 .10 .28 .26 .61 .55 .31 .54 .34 
19. ForAcc 3.39 1.11 -.01 .03 .02 .03 .00 .04 .09 -.14 .19 .10 .38 .33 .46 .44 .24 .41 .28 
20. EvacPrep 0.21 0.41 .12 -.03 .04 -.07 .00 -.01 .03 -.01 .09 .21 .10 .13 .02 -.02 .07 -.06 .07 
21. EvacAct 0.04 0.19 -.03 -.02 -.11 -.14 .01 -.08 .03 .12 .04 .07 .01 -.02 .00 -.06 .03 .02 .04 
22. SalePrep 0.04 0.19 .08 -.08 -.04 .00 .01 .01 -.05 -.01 -.01 .07 .01 .02 .04 .01 .08 .02 .02 
23. SaleAct 0.02 0.13 .04 -.07 -.08 .02 .02 .00 -.04 .00 -.01 -.02 .02 .02 .04 .01 .05 .05 .01 
24. InsRev 0.27 0.44 .02 -.04 .02 .12 .09 .05 .03 -.10 .11 .23 .17 .24 .09 .09 .10 .03 .12 
25. InsPur 0.03 0.16 .05 -.08 .01 .09 .02 -.03 -.04 -.03 .02 .12 .02 .06 -.04 -.07 .04 -.05 -.08 
26. HazAdj 0.10 0.18 .09 -.03 .01 .02 .03 .01 .03 -.03 .09 .26 .14 .19 .05 .02 .12 -.01 .09 
Variable 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
18. WarnConf -        
19. ForAcc .48 -       
20. EvacPrep .01 -.01 -          
21. EvacAct .02 -.08 .32 -        
22. SalePrep .03 -.01 .21 .24 -      
23. SaleAct .05 -.07 .12 .38 .56 -    
24. InsRev .11 .17 .36 .09 .20 .14 -  
25. InsPur -.01 -.04 .18 .13 .28 .21 .24 - 
26. HazAdj .07 .04 .73 .50 .55 .47 .71 .47 
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Correlations in bold are significant at p < .01 
Note: 207 ≤ N ≤ 408. Gender (Female = 1; Male= 0), Ethnicity (White = 1; Other=0), Income (Less than $25,000=1; $25,001-$50,000=2; 
$50,001-$75,000=3; $75,001-$100,000=4; Over $100,000=5), Married (Married=1; Not married=0), HHSiz = Household size, CommBond = 
Community bondedness, Volcano (Mauna Loa= 1; Kīlauea = 0), GovtExpert = Agency and officials expertise, GovtTrust = Agency and officials 
trustworthiness, GovProResp = Agency and officials protection responsibility, NewsExpTr = News media expertise and trustworthiness, Self/peers 
= Self and peers expertise, trustworthiness, and protection responsibility, WarnConf = Warning confidence, AnyMeet = Attended any community 
meetings, TradMedia = Traditional media, NewMedia = New media, ForAcc = Past/future forecast accuracy, EvacPrep = Prepared to evacuate 
home, EvacAct = Actually evacuated home, SalePrep =  Prepared to put home up for sale, SaleAct = Actually put home up for sale, InsRev = 
Review insurance coverage, InsPur = Purchase or increase insurance. HazAdj= Overall hazard adjustment.
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4.3 Regression Analysis. Results from the regression analysis are presented in Table 2.6, 
the left panel of which presents the results from regressing the overall measure of hazard 
adjustment (HazAdj) onto the first 18 variables in the correlation analysis. The only significant 
predictor was whether the respondent attended any of the public meetings (AnyMeet), so the 
equation was re-estimated with AnyMeet as the only predictor. This produced b = 0.09, SE(b) = 
0.02, β = 0.26, t = 73.10, p < .000, R2 = 0.07, adjusted R2 = 0.06, F1,212 = 14.89, p < .000). One 
limitation of this analysis is that the meetings were only held at Kīlauea, so all Mauna Loa 
respondents necessarily had missing data for the analysis. Consequently, HazAdj was reanalyzed 
deleting AnyMeet from the variable list. The results in the second panel of Table 6 show that 
NewMedia was the best predictor. Consequently, the regression equation was re-estimated with 
that variable as the only predictor.  This produced b = 0.02, SE(b) = 0.01, β = 0.19, t = 3.85, p < 
.000, R2 = 0.04, adjusted R2 = 0.03, F1,398 = 14.84, p < .000).  
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Table 2.6: Regression analysis results. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
 b SE  Beta t Sig. b SE Beta t  Sig. 
Gender .04 .03 .11 1.41 .16 .02 .02 .08 1.37 .17 
Age .00 .00 .04 .46 .65 .00 .00 .01 .22 .83 
Ethnicity  -.01 .01 -.11 -1.29 .20 -.00 .00 -.04 -.76 .45 
Income .02 .01 .11 1.22 .22 .00 .01 .00 .03 .97 
Married .00 .03 .00 .00 .99 .02 .02 .05 .76 .45 
HHSize .01 .01 .04 .47 .64 .00 .01 .02 .26 .79 
CommBond .02 .02 .11 1.32 .19 .01 .01 .06 .94 .35 
VolcanoSite      -.04 .02 -.12 -1.56 .12 
HazardZone .00 .02 .02 .22 .82 .01 .01 .03 .46 .65 
GovtExpert -.00 .03 -.00 -.03 .98 .00 .02 .00 .04 .97 
GovtTrust -.01 .03 -.05 -.41 .68 -.01 .02 -.06 -.64 .52 
GovtProResp .02 .01 .13 1.43 .16 .01 .01 .10 1.57 .12 
NewsExpTr -.03 .03 -.15 -1.02 .31 -.02 .02 -.10 -.94 .35 
Self/peers .01 .02 .06 .64 .53 .00 .01 .02 .33 .74 
WarnConf .02 .02 .08 .89 .38 .01 .01 .04 .57 .57 
ForAcc .00 .02 .00 .08 .94 -.00 .01 -.01 -.12 .91 
AnyMeet .09 .03 .27 3.42 .00      
TradMedia .01 .01 .09 .96 .34 .00 .01 .03 .44 .66 
NewMedia -.00 .01 -.01 -.06 .95 .02 .01 .12 1.75 .08 
Constant .80 .15  5.38 .00 .97 .09  10.70 .00 
 R2 =.18;  
Adjusted R2 = .08;  
F = 1.86;  
Degrees of freedom = 171 
R2 =.08;  
Adjusted R2 = .02;  
F = 1.47;  
Degrees of freedom = 340 
 
5. Discussion  
5.1 Analysis of Stakeholder Profiles. The analysis of stakeholders expertise revealed a 
hierarchy in which federal, state, and local government agencies were presumed to be the most 
knowledgeable; news media, self/family, and local elected officials were the next most 
knowledgeable; and state elected officials and peers were least knowledgeable. These results are 
somewhat similar to studies of seismic hazards by Lindell and Whitney (2000) and Arlikatti et al. 
(2007). However, the results are quite different from those of the Apatu et al. (2015) study of 
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tsunami hazards in another Pacific island population— American Samoa. However, with regard 
to the Hawai‘i and American Samoa studies, in Hawai‘i, volcano warnings and hazards are 
managed locally by the USGS HVO and Hawai‘i County Civil Defense. Traditionally, these two 
agencies have enjoyed a very strong presence in the community because of the frequency of hazard 
activity and communications with stakeholders about them. In contrast, tsunami warnings are 
relatively infrequent in American Samoa and derive in part from a very distant warning center in 
Honolulu.  
The ratings for volcano stakeholder trustworthiness revealed a relatively similar pattern to that 
of expertise, which replicates the findings of both Arlikatti et al. (2007) and Apatu et al. (2015). 
The similarity of the patterns of ratings for expertise and trustworthiness should not be 
misinterpreted to mean that the respondents could not distinguish between these two stakeholder 
characteristics because there were significant, though small, differences in the mean ratings. The 
differences suggest that these characteristics are inferred from slightly different information such 
as the stakeholders’ credentials (e.g., job title and formal education), treatment by respected 
sources, and past history of job performance (Lindell and Perry, 1992, p. 178). In particular, 
perceptions of job performance might be a function of the characteristics of the message these 
information sources transmit—consistency, accuracy, clarity, perceived confidence and certainty, 
guidance clarity concerning protective actions to be taken, and message frequency (Peek and 
Mileti, 2002).  
The ratings for protection responsibility also have some similarities and differences with 
previous studies (Ballentyne et al., 2000; Gregg et al., 2004a; Gregg et al., 2004b). The Hawai‘i 
volcano respondents rated self/family as more responsible than government agencies; the latter as 
more responsible than news media and elected officials; and peers as least responsible. Lindell and 
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Whitney (2000) found that self was considered to have the greatest protection responsibility, 
followed by government agencies and family, and that peers had the lowest levels. Moreover, 
Arlikatti et al. (2007) found self/family were considered more responsible than government, which 
was considered more responsible than news media, employers, and peers. Apatu et al. (2015) also 
found that self was most responsible, but that peers were next most responsible, followed by news 
media, and last by government officials. As with expertise and trustworthiness, the explanation for 
the differences among the studies cannot be determined unequivocally, but the much higher ratings 
of protection responsibility for peers than government agencies in the Samoan study is consistent 
with the close-knit extended family structure of Samoan society (Apatu et al., 2015) compared to 
what appears to exist in the Hawai‘i study areas. 
5.2 Correlation Analysis Results. Although the response actions in this study are very different 
from the hurricane evacuation studies that Baker (1991) and Huang (2016) reviewed, and 
somewhat different from those addressed in the broader set of hazard adjustment studies that 
Lindell (2013) reviewed, the conclusions about the effects of demographic variables are similar. 
That is, demographic variables have weak and inconsistent correlations with responses to the 
imminent threat at Kīlauea and the long-term hazard at Mauna Loa. This suggests that authorities 
can rely on communication strategies that target the risk area population as a whole rather than 
devoting resources to developing audience segmentation strategies that target specific 
demographic groups.  
Community bondedness was significantly correlated with ratings of government 
expertise/trustworthiness, indicating that those who felt more closely linked to their communities 
also thought government authorities were more credible information sources. Community 
bondedness was also significantly correlated with ratings of news media expertise/trustworthiness, 
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as well as with self/peer expertise/trustworthiness/protection responsibility and warning 
confidence. Despite these significant correlations, it was not significantly correlated with 
utilization of any of the three information channels— community meetings, traditional media, or 
new media. This is somewhat puzzling because Table 2-5 shows that the stakeholder 
characteristics (Variables 12-16) were significantly correlated with information channel utilization 
(Variables 10-11).  
Volcano site (i.e., Kīlauea vs. Mauna Loa subgroups) displayed a very different pattern from 
community bondedness. Kīlauea respondents indicated greater utilization of traditional and new 
media channels than those at Mauna Loa.  They also had higher ratings of self/peers’ 
expertise/trustworthiness/protection responsibility, and had greater confidence in forecast 
accuracy than Mauna Loa residents. In part, these results are a likely result of Kīlauea residents 
having dealt with a recent lava crisis, whereas those at Mauna Loa were only facing an elevated 
alert at the time of the survey. Moreover, there had not been an eruption of Mauna Loa in the study 
area since 1950 and no one had experienced a Mauna Loa lava flow since the most recent eruption 
in 1984. Moreover, only 21% of the Mauna Loa residents had even been living in their 
communities during the latter eruption, so it is unsurprising to see higher perceptions of 
stakeholders’ expertise and trustworthiness in Kīlauea’s hazard zones than in Mauna Loa’s hazard 
zones. Another relevant consideration is that Kīlauea residents had an opportunity to attend 
community-wide meetings with government authorities in 2014, unlike those at Mauna Loa. Thus, 
it is unsurprising that Kīlauea residents provided mean ratings for the accuracy of lava flow 
forecasts in the past that were higher than those for the perceived accuracy of future forecasts in 
the future at Mauna Loa. These results are consistent with findings at Mt. St. Helens that a past 
history of positive experience with authorities was a significant basis for residents’ perceptions of 
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the expertise and trustworthiness of government authorities (Lindell and Perry, 1992, p. 178). 
However, from a volcanological perspective, once vents are established and determine the source 
of lava flows, the higher slopes in the study area of Mauna Loa (e.g., 8 degrees) compared to those 
at Kīlauea (e.g., less than 3 degrees) could contribute to more accurate lava flow forecasts. 
Although one significant impediment to this is the uncertainty in whether or not flows bifurcate 
along the SWRZ.  
Hazard zone results supported findings from Lindell and Hwang (2008) who found that 
proximity to hazard sources affects respondents’ risk perceptions via higher levels of information 
dissemination in those areas at highest risk. In this study, respondents’ in the lower hazard zones 
showed significantly lower ratings for both information sources— traditional and new media. 
However, proximity to a hazard does not necessarily lead to accurate levels of risk perception 
(Lindell and Hwang, 2008; Wei and Lindell, 2017). It should also be noted that respondents in 
higher hazard zones at Kīlauea had greater confidence in forecasting accuracy.  
Given the effort that government authorities put into the community meetings on Kīlauea, it is 
interesting to find that attendance at such meetings had no significant correlations with perceptions 
of government expertise, trustworthiness, or protection responsibility. However, attendance at 
community meetings did have the highest correlation with overall hazard adjustment—especially 
with insurance review and evacuation preparation. Of course, given the cross-sectional nature of 
these data, it is not possible to determine the direction of causality for this correlation (Lindell, 
2008). One possible explanation is that attendance at meetings might have prompted people to 
review insurance and prepare to evacuate. This is not surprising since conversations at times 
focused on insurance and the moratorium. In one instance, a community member adamant about 
not diverting the lava flow suggested that the audience should focus on reviewing their home 
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owner’s insurance policy and preventing damage by fire. However, property is not insured against 
destruction by lava, but rather by fire caused by the lava. Another possibility is that their insurance 
reviews and evacuation preparations might have led them to attend the meetings to obtain further 
information. Finally, all three activities (meeting attendance, insurance review, and emergency 
preparedness) might have been stimulated by some other variable. 
Community meeting attendance was not significantly correlated with either traditional or new 
media, but that should not be misinterpreted to mean that the community meetings had no effect 
on dissemination of lava flow information through either of those two types of channels. Instead, 
the low correlations among the information channels suggest that the community meetings served 
as a useful channel of information for those residents who tended not to rely on these other two 
information channels. That is, the community meetings were an important supplement to the 
traditional media (TV, radio, and newspaper) and new media (internet web sites and social media). 
Utilization of traditional media was strongly correlated with utilization of new media (r = 
0.56), which contrasts with a rather widespread impression that these two types of channels appeal 
to completely different audiences. Part of the explanation might be that three of the items in the 
new media scale were websites (one item for TV, radio, and newspaper websites; one for the USGS 
HVO website; and one for the Hawai’i Civil Defense website), whereas the fourth item referred 
only to social media (in general) rather than individual channels such as Facebook and Twitter or 
blog sites, which were commonly used during the Kīlauea crisis. Consequently, future studies may 
attempt to distinguish among the different types of “new media” to determine if different forms of 
social media create a type of communication channel that is distinct from internet usage.  
In any event, traditional and new media channels were both significantly correlated with all of 
the perceived stakeholder characteristics scales (average r = 0.28). One interpretation of this 
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finding is that people who had higher perceptions of stakeholders’ expertise and trustworthiness 
were more likely to utilize these channels. This would seem quite plausible for perceptions of news 
media expertise/trustworthiness and, possibly, government expertise and trustworthiness. 
However, this would not explain the equally high correlations with self/peer 
expertise/trustworthiness/protection responsibility. Instead, it seems more likely that causation is 
in the other direction—traditional and new media channels tended to convey a consistent story 
about the predictability of the lava flow threat and appropriate responses to that threat. This widely 
disseminated information, in turn, increased local residents’ perceptions of the expertise of 
government authorities, the news media with whom these authorities shared their information, and 
the local residents who received that information through the traditional and new media sources. 
The conclusion about the media and stakeholder correlations in the preceding paragraph is 
further supported by the significant positive correlations of stakeholder characteristics with 
forecast accuracy and warning confidence. The results for forecast accuracy, which addressed 
locations affected, as well as arrival times and lava amounts at those locations, indicate that the 
high ratings of government and news media expertise/trustworthiness are not just superficial 
endorsements; Kīlauea residents’ ratings of these characteristics in the survey are related to their 
positive assessments of government and news media during the 2014-2015 lava flow crisis. This 
is particularly welcome news given the great uncertainties HVO scientists faced during the Kīlauea 
crisis— this was the longest Kīlaeua lava flow in the last 500 years, and the only one that travelled 
significant distances in underground cracks and then reemerged to continue flowing overland (see 
Poland et al., 2016)  
The explanation for the Mauna Loa residents is a bit more indirect than for Kīlauea residents, 
but it is quite plausible that their ratings of forecast accuracy for future volcanic crises are based 
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on their positive assessments of government and news media during Kīlauea’s 2014-15 lava flow 
crisis. Mauna Loa residents not being directly affected by the Kīlauea crisis could explain why 
they had slightly lower evaluations of forecast accuracy (r = -0.14). Equally important is that 
assessments of forecast accuracy were significantly correlated with confidence in the quality of 
future warnings (r = 0.48). Specifically, the respondents expected to receive an accurate forecast 
of lava arrival time, a timely official evacuation warning, adequate time for evacuation 
preparations, and sufficient time to evacuate to a safe location. Such expectations are high for a 
volcano when volcano tremor is only known to have provided between 21 and 115 minutes of 
advance warning of an eruption during 20th century eruptions (Gregg et al. 2004b). For some 
residents, their proximity to the eruption sources along the SWRZ makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, to forecast where and when lava will arrive prior to the establishment of eruptive vents. 
While USGS HVO interpret the current unrest indicators as indicative of an eruption on the SWRZ, 
eruptions often start high on the rift and propagate down rift, but this takes time to forecast, adding 
greatly to the complexity of providing early predictions of the paths lava flows will take.  
Surprisingly, this study produced findings that were inconsistent with the seismic studies of 
Lindell and Whitney (2000) and Arlikatti et al. (2007). Unlike these other studies, respondents 
who viewed themselves and their families as more knowledgeable and trustworthy, as well as more 
personally responsible for their own protection, were not more likely to take protective actions 
than those without these views. This might be due to the small percentages of respondents who 
took protective actions, a condition that produces variance restriction in the dependent variable 
and, in turn, attenuation of the correlations of the dependent variable with any of the independent 
variables (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994).  
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As was the case with Arlikatti et al. (2007), ratings of government protection responsibility 
had slightly lower correlations with the other two stakeholder characteristics—expertise and 
trustworthiness. This provides further support for the idea that perceptions of protection 
responsibility have a different basis than perceptions of expertise and trustworthiness. One 
possibility is that perceptions of protection responsibility are based on fundamental values such as 
individualism (e.g., Hofstede, 2001). Another possibility is that emergency managers have been 
effective in conveying the message that, in a major disaster, households will need to be self-
sufficient for a week because government agencies will be overwhelmed and unable to help.  
5.3 Regression Analysis Results. The regression analysis of Model 1 confirmed the correlation 
analysis finding that community meeting attendance was the most important predictor of hazard 
adjustment and also showed that traditional and new media utilization did not provide a significant 
increment in prediction. However, community meetings were only held in the Kīlauea study area, 
so Mauna Loa residents had missing data on that variable. Consequently, Model 2 deleted 
community meeting attendance from the variable list and re-estimated the prediction equation. 
Consistent with the correlation analyses, the variable with the most significant regression 
coefficient was utilization of new media. Thus, the regression analysis results, together with those 
from the correlation analyses, are consistent with previous findings that information seeking is a 
response to environmental threats that leads to protective actions (Mileti and Fitzpatrick, 1992).  
5.4 Study Limitations. Several study limitations were discernible. The sample under-
represented respondents’ in the highest hazard zones and over-represented respondents’ in the 
lowest hazard zones, which is unsurprising given the relatively sparse populations in the highest 
hazard zones. In other respects, the sample was generally representative of the geographical area 
when compared to the American Community Survey (ACS, 2016).  
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6. Conclusions 
This study examined differences in people’s perceptions of themselves and their families, their 
peers, news media, elected officials, and government agencies regarding three characteristics 
(hazard expertise, trustworthiness, and protection responsibility) across areas of varying lava flow 
hazard and recency at Kīlauea and Mauna Loa volcanoes. Respondents rated government agencies 
overall as higher in trustworthiness and expertise than other stakeholders. Nonetheless, 
respondents rated themselves higher than other stakeholders for protection responsibility.  
Community bondedness, utilization of traditional media and new media, and perceptions of 
stakeholders were all found to be significantly correlated to high levels (M = 4.05 on a 1-5 scale) 
of confidence in warnings of future lava flow threats. However, only attendance at community 
meetings (held only at Kīlauea in 2014) and utilization of traditional media and new media were 
related to the adoption of hazard adjustments such as preparing to evacuate, reviewing insurance 
coverage, and purchasing additional insurance. Moreover, even these actions were relatively rare, 
being taken by 21, 27, and 3 percent of the respondents. Percentages of households actually 
evacuating (4%), preparing to sell their homes (4%), and putting their homes on the market (2%) 
were very small. We note that some at Kīlauea may not have placed their home on the market for 
sale because the moratorium would have reduced prospective buyers to only those paying cash 
and therefore able to self-insure, since mortgages could not be accommodated without insurance. 
This study supports previous research indicating that people generally rely on themselves to 
protect their lives and property and have trusted experts from whom they can seek information 
while monitoring the onset of hazards such as lava flows (Apatu et al., 2015; Lindell and Perry, 
2012; Birkmann et al., 2008). Confidence in the timeliness and accuracy of lava flow forecasts 
will allow these residents to prepare for and take protective action when the need arises. But 
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government agencies should be careful to avoid promoting residents’ excessively high levels of 
confidence in warnings and forecasts when current scientific and emergency management 
constraints cannot support such confidence. For example, the study found that residence in areas 
of high lava flow hazard correlated with increased perceptions of accurate lava flow forecasts; that 
is, those in high hazard zones closest to the source of eruptions were more likely than their 
counterparts in areas of lower lava flow hazards to believe USGS would issue accurate lava 
forecasts. Of course, having higher confidence is not necessarily the same as excessively high 
confidence. In this regard, it is important to note that other research has shown that people 
recognize the uncertainty in the forecasts of hurricanes (Wu et al., 2014, 2015) and tornadoes 
(Lindell et al., 2016; Jon et al., in press, a, b). 
In general, this study showed the relationship between respondents’ confidence in several 
events important in decision-making during emergencies. Evacuations were most significantly 
correlated with respondents’ past experience with lava forecasts. These included: a) locations 
likely to be affected, b) amount of lava expected at those locations, and c) time at which lava would 
be expected at these locations. Respondents’ at Kīlauea had a higher mean rating for confidence 
in warnings than those at Mauna Loa, which is potentially the result of recent population growth 
of non-native residents’ that have had no hazard experience in the past. This supported the 
implication of previous findings that past hazard experience has a significant influence on 
perceived confidence in warnings. Surprisingly, this study’s findings were inconsistent with those 
from Lindell and Whitney (2000) and Arlikatti et al. (2007), which found that respondents who 
viewed themselves and their families as more knowledgeable and trustworthy, as well as more 
personally responsible for their own protection, were not more likely to take protective actions 
than those without these views. However, this might be due to a methodological artifact. This study 
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also found the respondents’ community bondedness had a significant influence on their confidence 
in warnings and their perceptions of stakeholders.  
Future work will continue to improve resilience to eruptions through better understanding of 
hazard processes, such as lava flow emplacement processes and perceptions and responses by the 
general population. Government officials charged with making decisions about whether 
evacuation is warranted must evaluate the risks of unnecessary or delayed evacuations. If they can 
make reliable predictions of how individuals and communities respond to information about the 
volcanic event and its hazards, along with information about protective actions, including 
evacuation in response to warnings, then they will be better prepared to balance those risks. 
Similarly, physical scientists have the chance to learn from stakeholders such as policy makers and 
residents regarding decision criteria and societal priorities, which may help guide priorities in how 
to reduce, treat, and communicate uncertainties.  
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in open channels, and the transition from Pāhoehoe to A’a”, Bulletin of Volcanology, 61:306-323. 
 
Chester, D. K., Dibben, C. J., and Duncan, A. M. (2002). Volcanic hazard assessment in western 
Europe. Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, 115(3-4), 411-435.  
 
Cutter, S. and Barnes, K. (1982). “Evacuation behavior and Three Mile Island”, Disasters, 6(2), 
116-124.  
 53 
Cutter, S., Boruff, B.J. and Shirley, W.L. (2003). “Social vulnerability to environmental hazards”, 
Social Science Quarterly, 84(2), 242-262.  
 
Davis, M., Johnston, D., Becker, J., Leonard, G., Coomer, M., and Gregg, C. (2006). Risk 
perceptions and preparedness: Mt Rainier 2006 community assessment tabulated results. GNS 
Science Report, 17, 1–43.  
 
Dillman, D.A. (2000). Mail and internet surveys: The tailored design method (2nd Ed.). New York: 
Wiley. 
 
Doyle, E. E., Mcclure, J., Johnston, D. M., and Paton, D. (2014). Communicating likelihoods and 
probabilities in forecasts of volcanic eruptions. Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal 
Research, 272, 1-15.  
 
Drabek, T.E. (1969). “Social processes in disaster: family evacuation”, Social Problems, 16(3), 
336-349.  
 
Drabek, T., and Boggs, K. (1968). ‘‘Families in disaster: Reactions and relatives.’’ Journal of 
Marriage and the Family, 30, 443–451.  
 
Eiser, J. R., Bostrom, A., Burton, I., Johnston, D. M., McClure, J., Paton, D., and White, M. P. 
(2012). Risk interpretation and action: A conceptual framework for responses to natural 
hazards. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction,1, 5-16.  
 
Ewert, J. W., Guffanti, M., and Murray, T.L. (2005). "An Assessment of Volcanic Threat and 
Monitoring Capabilities in the Unites States: Framework for a National Volcano Early Warning 
System." USGS Open File Report 2005-1164: 62. 
 
Gladwin, C.H., Gladwin, H., and Peacock, W.G. (2001). “Modeling hurricane evacuation 
decisions with ethnographic methods,” International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 
19, 117–143.  
 
Greene, M.R., Perry, R.W. and Lindell, M.K. (1981). “The March 1980 eruptions of Mt. St. 
Helens: Citizen perceptions of volcano threat.” Disasters, 5, 49-66. 
 
Gregg, C. E., Houghton, B. F., Johnston, D. M., Paton, D., and Swanson. D.A. (2004a). “The 
Perception of Volcanic Risk in Kona Communities from Mauna Loa and Hualālai Volcanoes, 
Hawai‘i,” Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, 130, 179-196.  
 
Gregg, C.E., Houghton, B.F., Paton, D., Swanson, D.A., and Johnston, D.M. (2004b). 
“Community preparedness for lava flows from Mauna Loa and Hualālai Volcanoes, Kona, 
Hawaii,” Bulletin of Volcanology, 66, 531-540.  
 
 
 
 54 
Gregg, C.E., Houghton, B.F., Paton, D., Swanson, D.A., Lachman, R., and Bonk, W.J. (2008). 
“Hawaiian cultural influences on support for lava flow hazard mitigation measures during the 
January 1960 eruption of Kīlauea volcano, Kapoho, Hawai‘i,” Journal of Volcanology and 
Geothermal Research, 172, 300-307 
 
Heath, S.E., Kass, P.H., Beck, A.M., and Glickman, L.T. (2001). “Human and pet-related risk 
factors for household evacuation failure during a natural disaster,” American Journal of 
Epidemiology, 153, 659–667.  
 
Heliker, C., Swanson D. A., and Takahashi, T. J., (2003), “The Pu‘u ‘Ö‘ö-Küpaianaha Eruption 
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CHAPTER 3  
RESIDENT PERCEPTIONS OF LAVA FLOW HAZARD DIVERSION STRATEGIES AND 
PROTECTIVE MEASURES ON KĪLAUEA AND MAUNA LOA VOLCANOES, HAWAI‘I 
Abstract. Public opinion about various volcano hazard mitigation strategies and people’s 
willingness to accept additional risk to their personal property in exchange for helping protect 
important elements of their community’s infrastructure are poorly understood in volcanology, even 
on the island of Hawai‘i where structural attempts to divert lava flows have been tried since 1881. 
Perceived characteristics of two common mitigation measures—berms/barriers and bombs were 
examined based on perceptions of stakeholders, past crisis experiences, the lava flow hazard zone 
in which respondents reside, confidence in warnings, and socio-demographic and cultural factors. 
Several eruptions of Kīlauea and Mauna Loa over the last ca. 100 years provided island residents 
and agencies with abundant lava flow hazard experience. Earthen barriers, bombs, and water have 
been the most common strategies used to date, but a variety of factors outlined by the State Lava 
Flow Hazard Technical Committee (2002) mean that such mitigation strategies are unlikely to be 
used in future eruptions. And while there are certainly technical and feasibility concerns, this is in 
part due to the widespread belief that Hawaiian people oppose interfering in the path of lava. There 
were opposing voices over the use of traditional earthen barriers to divert a lava flow that 
threatened communities during the recent crisis on Kīlauea in 2014, but there was no opposition 
to the electrical authority’s use of relatively small scale structural controls to locally divert lava 
around and insulate electric power poles to protect the electrical grid and ensure residents’ access 
to electricity. Results of sample survey research on adult resident populations (N= 421) in areas of 
high lava flow hazard on Kīlauea’s east rift zone and Mauna Loa’s southwest rift zone indicate 
that respondents’ supported earthen berms/trenches more so than bombing/blasting. Additionally, 
they were more willing to accept some increased risk to their personal property in exchange for 
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protecting critical elements of their community’s infrastructure (i.e. major roads, electric 
substations, and schools). However, respondents were less likely to agree to accept some increased 
risk to their personal property in exchange for protecting important commercial areas of their 
community (i.e. shopping centers).  
Understanding the factors that influence public support for, and opposition to, various 
mitigation strategies could facilitate official agency decision-making process concerning any 
future eruptions where diversion of lava could mitigate lava flow hazards or their impacts.   
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1. Introduction  
Lava flows from Kīlauea and Mauna Loa volcanoes, Hawai‘i represent significant threats to 
property in the southern half of Hawai‘i Island because they burn, inundate, or isolate property. 
And although engineered strategies to mitigate lava flows have been tried in Hawai‘i since the late 
19th century (Gregg et al., 2004b) and elsewhere in the world as early as the 17th century (i.e. Sicily 
in 1669; see Baldwin, 1953), decisions to interfere with the natural path of lava flows in Hawai‘i 
are seldom taken because they are constrained by geological, engineering, and logistical factors, 
as well as legal, environmental and socio-cultural considerations (Lockwood and Torgerson, 1980; 
Gregg et al., 2008). Consequently, understanding how to balance the costs and benefits of 
protecting human lives and infrastructure is a major challenge to land-use planning on Hawai‘i 
island where speculative land subdivision between 1958 and 1978 (Cooper and Daws, 1990) 
contributed to the spread of homes in very remote and isolated areas of the island, many of which 
are unpermitted and off the electrical and water grid. Relatively few mitigation actions can be 
taken to protect property from lava flows, so it is unsurprising that Murton and Shimabukuro 
(1974) reported that evacuation and removal of valuables were the most common hazard 
adjustments to eruptions of Kīlauea at that time. But the June 27, 2014 lava flow crisis on Kīlauea 
(Poland et al., 2016) involved a slow moving lava flow that provided two local landowners the 
opportunity to construct earthen berms with bulldozers and authorities to experiment with various 
methods to protect a key road and parts of the electrical grid from the threat of lava inundation. 
This study focuses on better understanding Hawai‘i Island residents’ attitudes toward the growing 
number of possible strategies which might be used to mitigate lava flow hazards on the island and 
protect investments in increasingly expensive infrastructure in remote areas of the island. 
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Over 50% of Mauna Loa’s surface has been buried within the past 1,500 years (Lockwood and 
Lipman, 1980), posing a lava flow threat to people and property in the political districts of South 
Hilo, Puna, Ka‘ū, South Kona, North Kona, and South Kohala (Fig. 3.1). Historical lava flows 
have typically emanated from the summit and from vents on the Southwest Rift Zone (SWRZ) and 
the Northeast Rift Zone (NERZ), although so-called radial vents on the north and northwest flanks 
of the volcano (Trusdell, 1995; Fig. 3.2) have also erupted in historic times. Mauna Loa has had 
33 eruptions since 1843. The last eruption was in 1984 and increases in indicators of unrest over 
recent years prompted scientists of the US Geological Survey Hawai‘i Volcano Observatory 
(USGS HVO) to increase the Volcano Alert level (VAL) from Normal to Advisory in September 
2015 (USGS, 2015). Informally, USGS had indicated that the unrest appeared indicative of an 
eruption on the SWRZ, which would place people and property in the districts of Ka‘ū and South 
Kona at risk. The last eruption in this area of the island was in 1950, so few people today have any 
direct experience with eruptions there, where lava flows travel fast due to combinations of steep 
slopes and high effusion rates. 
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Figure 3.1: Location of volcanoes in study area and the districts of Puna, South Kona, and Ka‘ū (dashed 
black line). This figure also shows the USGS lava flow hazard zones.  
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Figure 3.2: Map showing lava flows erupted from Mauna Loa within the past 750 years as well as Mauna 
Loa’s Southwest Rift Zone (SWRZ), major highways, nearby towns, and the largest residential 
subdivision on the island (Hawaiian Ocean View Estates).  
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In contrast to Mauna Loa, Kīlauea is one of the world’s most active volcanoes and over 90% 
of its surface is covered by lava less than 1,100 years old (Fig. 3.3). Kīlauea has erupted 34 times 
since 1952 and almost continuously along its ERZ (Fig. 3.3) since 1983. Additionally, a vent 
opened in 2008 at the volcano’s summit crater—Halemaʻumaʻu, which hosts an active lava pond 
and a vigorous gas plume. Since 1955, most of the activity has occurred along the East Rift Zone 
(ERZ) in rural Puna District or within Hawai‘i Volcanoes National Park (HVNP). Lava flows from 
several eruptions since 1955 have caused considerable impacts to private property in lower Puna, 
although the on-going Pu‘u‘Ō‘ō eruption since 1983 has mostly affected land inside HVNP. A 
recent exception was the June 27, 2014 lava flow, which flowed some 20km from its source, 
toward and into the village of Pāhoa in lower Puna District (Poland et al., 2016), prompting a 
Presidential Disaster Declaration in November 2014 (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2015). The declaration allowed federal resources to be used to assist county and state government 
in responding to the threat of lava inundation and isolation. Additionally, activity at Pu‘u‘Ō‘ō 
shifted downrift in May 3, 2018 from a point source to fissure source eruption, causing destruction 
of property and prompting yet another Presidential Disaster Declaration (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2018) on May 11.  
It is worthy to note that just two weeks prior to the beginning of the lava flow crisis on Kīlauea 
in late August 2014 (i.e., when USGS issued a press release stating that the lava flow could be a 
concern to people in Puna and community meetings began being held), the area of lower Puna 
affected by the threat of lava inundation and isolation was also severely affected by a hurricane 
that made landfall as Tropical Storm Iselle on August 8, 2014 (National Hurricane Center, 2014). 
In addition to coastal erosion, wind damage caused exotic Albizia trees with broad canopies to 
snap under high wind shear. The downing of Albizias blocked roads and fell utility power poles 
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and electrical lines across much of the southern half of the island, exacerbating direct damages to 
structures (National Hurricane Center, 2018). The extensive damage prompted a Presidential 
Disaster Declaration (Federal Emergency Management Agency DR-4194, 2014).  When the lava 
flow crisis began, residents demanded from elected and appointed officials during community 
meetings that roads, internet, cell-phone and electricity be maintained. This may have proved to 
be an important factor in the way residents viewed some subsequent lava flow mitigation actions 
carried out during the eruption in 2014. 
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Figure 3.3: Map showing lava flows from Kīlauea within the past 750 years as well as Kīlauea’s East Rift 
Zone (ERZ), Hwy 130 (gray line), Railroad Avenue (orange line), Government Beach Road 
(green line), Chain of Craters Road (blue line), and the location of the central down of Pahoa.   
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This study aims to better understand public opinion and factors influencing, various mitigation 
strategies that have been used on the island and whether or not residents would accept additional 
risk to their personal property in exchange for helping protect important elements of their 
community’s infrastructure.  
2. Background 
Several eruptions of Kīlauea and Mauna Loa over the last ca. 100 years have provided island 
residents and agencies with abundant lava flow hazard experience. Earthen barriers, bombs and 
water have been the most common strategies used to date. However, decisions to implement 
mitigation strategies using public resources are complex and involve consideration of many 
factors, including legal, environmental, and feasibility (i.e., technical) considerations, in addition 
to cultural factors (Lockwood and Torgerson, 1980; Hawaii County Civil Defense, 2002; Gregg 
et al., 2008). 
2.1 Mitigation efforts in the past. The earliest known attempt to influence the path of lava 
occurred in 1669 on Mount Etna, Italy and involved digging a trench to divert the lava (Baldwin, 
1953). But in Hawai‘i, the first known example of engineered measures to mitigate lava flow 
hazards was a hand-built stone wall constructed hastily during the 1880–1881 eruption of Mauna 
Loa that threatened a sugar mill in Hilo (Baldwin, 1953). Bombs were used to disrupt Mauna Loa 
lava flows advancing on Hilo in 1935 and again in 1942 (Jaggar, 1936a,b; Finch and Macdonald, 
1949; Lockwood and Torgerson, 1980). Later, in 1955, residents used bulldozers to construct 
earthen barriers to protect their private property during an eruption of Kı̄lauea (Macdonald and 
Eaton, 1955) and in 1960 the state organized barriers to protect the village of Kapoho and a US 
Coast Guard facility (Macdonald, 1962). Permanent barriers to protect Hilo have long been 
proposed (Macdonald, 1958), but have never been constructed. However, a barrier was constructed 
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in the mid-1980s high on the north flank of Mauna Loa to protect a weather observatory (Moore, 
1982), but it has yet to be tested in an eruption. Water has also been used extensively during 
Hawaiian eruptions dating from at least 1955 and 1960 into the 1980s–1990s (Pierce, 1960; 
Wilhelm, 1960a; Macdonald, 1962; Gregg, 2005). A State of Hawai‘i Lava Flow Hazard Technical 
Committee report (Hawai‘i State Civil Defense, 2002) discussed the possibility of using 
engineered measures to divert future lava flows in high risk areas. The report highlighted concern 
that liability, reliability, funding, and cultural issues could prevent the use of such measures in the 
future (see also Gregg et al., 2008). The report also described how, for example, decisions to 
mitigate lava flows may be based partly on expert scientific opinion, but that public opposition 
might be sufficient to prevent it. 
2.2 Recent mitigation measures. On June 27, 2014, a new vent on Pu‘u‘Ō‘ō opened on Kīlauea, 
allowing lava to flow northeast toward the town of Pāhoa rather than south as it had for most of 
the eruption since 1983. Pāhoa had about 945 residents (U.S Census Bureau, 2010). Local 
businessmen constructed earthen berms to protect their property while the local utility authority 
constructed novel structures around electric utility poles to protect the flow of electricity to public 
and private property. Local authorities also analyzed and tested alternative strategies for 
maintaining the flow of vehicular traffic over an active lava tube system, although no method was 
actually employed.  
One major cause for concern was the potential for the advancing lava flow to cross Highway 
130, which is the only highway that connects the eastern corner of the island to the rest of the 
island, including the city of Hilo some 25-30 km north where most people are employed. This 
threat was especially problematic as 260 businesses that provided 1,200 jobs in Puna would have 
been isolated (Hawai‘i County Civil Defense, 2015; Fig. 3.3. Such isolation would not only have 
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influenced the local economy and local workers, but also critical delivery routes for materials 
(Hawai‘i State Civil Defense, 2015). To reduce this vulnerability, the county and state departments 
of transportation began grading two existing minor roads (Railroad Avenue and Government 
Beach Road) farther downslope from Highway 130 that could serve as alternate evacuation routes 
should lava cross Highway 130. Additionally, an extension of Highway 130 inside Hawai‘i 
Volcanoes National Park (called Chain of Craters Road) was cleared of several kilometers of lava 
emplaced during previous decades.  
The Hawai‘i Electric Light Company (HELCO), along with scientists at the USGS HVO, and 
University of Hawai‘i at Hilo, devised an innovative three-layer protective jacket and installed it 
around utility/electrical poles that were in the path of the June 27, 2014 lava flow, to protect the 
poles from contact with lava and hopefully maintain the flow of electricity (Hawai‘i County Civil 
Defense, 2015). Only one pole was touched by lava and it burned partially from the base upward, 
causing the pole to subside but not fail to maintain the electrical supply.  
Besides protecting the utility poles and experimenting with methods to maintain a road across 
any long-lived lava tube, additional preparedness measures were taken to support community 
members in the event lava crossed Highway 130. These actions included creating redundant 
electrical, fire and police services. Commercial businesses closed, as did both public and private 
schools, whose students were reassigned to schools outside the affected lava hazard zones.  
According to Hawai‘i State Civil Defense (2013), the projected average annualized losses for 
lava inundation is about $24 million/year. Consequently, many of the island residents are familiar 
with lava flow impacts. And, despite the public debate about barriers to protect relatively large 
property (e.g., houses, businesses, police and fire stations and schools), there appeared to be no 
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similar public discussion of, let alone opposition to, the new mitigation strategies that protected 
the electrical power poles, preserving the electrical grid and supply of electricity. 
The Hawai‘i State Civil Defense (2013) stated, “the chief threat to lava flows to property 
owners is that the flows may burn structures and bury land in areas where the lava inundation 
threat was ignored in development by the private sector and government,” (pp. 46). The State of 
Hawai‘i Lava Flow Hazard Technical Committee report (Hawaii State Civil Defense, 2002) 
emphasized that cultural opposition to lava flow diversion could alone preclude the use of 
engineering strategies (Gregg et al., 2008). Hawaiian cultural sensitivity to proposals for 
engineered mitigation of lava flows is linked to belief in Pele, the goddess of volcanoes and one 
of the most widely known Hawaiian deities (Nimmo, 1992). Gregg et al. (2008) found that cultural 
aspects of mitigation are more complex than had been assumed by previous hazard assessments 
and mitigation plans. Specifically, data collected among some 648 island residents during the 1960 
eruption of Kīlauea in Kapoho demonstrated a level of support in 1960 for barriers, regardless of 
factors such as belief in Pele (Gregg et al., 2008). However, during the 2014-15 lava crisis 
residents, expressed mixed opinions. In the end, the only barriers that were built were constructed 
by private landowners to protect their private property, rather than by authorities.  
2.3 Hazard zonation. Volcanic hazard zonation on the Island of Hawai‘i was first completed 
in 1974 (Mullineaux and Peterson, 1974), revised in 1987 (Holcomb, 1987), and then revised again 
in 1992 (USGS, 1992). The most recent map divides the island into nine zones, with lava flows 
most likely to occur in Zone 1 and least likely in Zone 9 (Fig. 3.1). The probability of future lava 
flows varies across the Island of Hawai‘i and is greatest on Kīlauea and Mauna Loa. The southern 
half of the island that includes the active volcanoes Kīlauea, Mauna Loa, and Hūalalai is designated 
Zones 1 through 6, while Zones 7-9 are found on two volcanoes in the northern half of the island 
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that have not erupted in thousands of years. Zone 1 only includes the summits and dual rift zones 
of Kīlauea and Mauna Loa (where vents have been repeatedly active in historical times) and Zone 
2 is only found adjacent to, and downslope from, Zone 1. Zone 3 is less hazardous than Zone 2 
because of greater distance from recently active vents or because elevated topography reduces the 
hazard. Zone 4 is restricted to Hūalalai where eruptions are less frequent than at Mauna Loa and 
Kīlauea, although the last eruptions were in 1800-1801 (Moore et al., 1987). High topography 
reduces the threat in the two other zones—Zone 5 on Kīlauea and Zone 6 on Mauna Loa. 
2.4 Socio-demographic characteristics. Individuals with lower income often have challenges 
that others do not (Leather, 2014). More people in low income groups reside in areas that are 
deemed geographically hazardous because these areas are generally less desirable and hence less 
expensive. Also, cultural belief systems that have historical foundations can influence settlement 
in certain areas (Gregg et al., 2003).  
2.5 Stakeholder perceptions of mitigation measures. Using unpublished data collected from 
over 600 island residents across four communities on the island of Hawai‘i during the 1960 
eruption in Kapoho, Gregg et al. (2008) found significant differences in attitudes regarding the use 
of barriers versus bombs to mitigate lava flow hazards that threatened, and eventually inundated, 
the small village of Kapoho on the eastern tip of Hawai‘i Island. There were differences regarding 
the use of bombs and those agreeing they would help unload the bombs included those who both 
did and did not believe the military should bomb the lava, underscoring the complexity of 
understanding people’s reasoning processes in mitigation decisions. Gregg et al. (2008) also found 
an overwhelming disparity between expressed support for barriers compared to bombs. People of 
both Hawaiian and non-Hawaiian ethnicity showed support for the barriers. There is strong 
evidence that risk perception is related to people’s hazard adjustment (Huang et al., 2017; Lindell 
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and Whitney, 2000; Lindell et al., 2017; Lindell and Perry, 1992; Lindell and Prater, 2002; Lindell 
et al., 2009).  Beneficial attributes of mitigation strategies (i.e., their ability to protect people and 
property and their usefulness for other purposes) were significantly correlated with people’s 
intention to adopt protective actions and actual adjustment (i.e., adoption of protective strategies) 
in studies of hazards such as, seismic (Lindell and Prater, 2002; Lindell and Whitney, 2000), flood 
(Terpstra and Lindell, 2013), and water contamination (Lindell et al., 2017). In contrast, these 
studies have shown that cost-related attributes of mitigation strategies (i.e., their cost, time/effort, 
requirement for specialized knowledge/skill and specialized tools/equipment, and social 
cooperation) had nonsignificant correlations with intentions to adopt protective actions or actual 
adjustments.  
2.6 Objective. The goal of this study is to understand public opinions about lava mitigation 
strategies such as diversion by berms or bombing—including the effectiveness of these mitigation 
strategies for lava flows and other hazards; their financial and legal considerations; and their 
requirements for specialized knowledge, skills, and cooperation. People’s acceptance of additional 
risk to personal property in exchange for protecting important elements of their community such 
as schools, major roads, electrical substation, and shopping centers was also considered, because 
it was observed during the 2014 lava flow crisis on Kīlauea that while there were both proponents 
for and advocates against the use of lava diversion strategies to protect private, commercial and 
public property, there was no indication that anyone spoke up about HELCO’s use of protective 
jackets around utility poles. Instead, residents passively accepted HELCO’s efforts to harden parts 
of the electrical grid that would help ensure that the flow of electricity was not interrupted by the 
lava flow. We evaluate these opinions about mitigation with crisis experience, perceptions of 
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stakeholders, perceptions of forecasting accuracy, confidence in warnings, and socio-demographic 
characteristics (i.e. marital status, household size, income, and education).  
3. Materials and Methods 
3.1 Survey procedure. Data used in this study were collected between April and July 2017 from 
adult residents 18 years and older of areas on Kīlauea and Mauna Loa volcanoes. We used two 
nearly identical household survey questionnaires. The Kīlauea survey focused on 800 households 
in the Puna District, whereas the Mauna Loa survey focused on 800 households in the Districts of 
South Kona and Ka‘ū (Fig. 3.1). These 1600 households were randomly selected and spatially 
distributed across three hazard zones at Kīlauea and four hazard zones at Mauna Loa that are 
illustrated on the HVO lava flow hazard map for the island (USGS, 1992). To increase the 
likelihood of equal response rates from males and females and younger and older adults, the survey 
cover letter and informed consent document asked that the questionnaire be completed by an adult 
person in the household over 18 years of age who most recently had a birthday. Following 
Dillman’s (2000) Tailored Design Method, each household was sent an initial questionnaire and 
non-respondents were sent a reminder postcard and as many as two replacement questionnaires. 
This process was terminated when non-respondents had been sent as many as one reminder 
postcard and three questionnaire packets. Some 138 (8.6%) packets were undeliverable and only 
one packet was refused. A total of 421 households returned usable questionnaires for a response 
rate of deliverable packets 29% (15% from Kīlauea and 14% from Mauna Loa). The present study 
included households in lava flow hazard zones 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, although the few respondents (N 
= 41) in zone 4 are actually located just off the flank of Mauna Loa and on the southwest flank of 
the volcano Hūalalai. Kīlauea zones 1, 2, and 3 were coded 1, 2, and 3, respectively; reflecting 
relatively high, moderate, and low hazard ranking. Similarly, Mauna Loa zones 1 and 2 were coded 
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1, zone 3 was coded 2, and zones 4 and 6 were coded 3, reflecting relatively high, moderate and 
low hazard ranking. Zone 2 was included with zone 1 on Mauna Loa primarily because of the steep 
slopes on the volcano, which increase lava flow velocities and corresponding hazards.  
Response rates differed significantly with respect to lava flow zonation on both volcanoes— 
that is, the rate or return was indirectly proportional to lava flow hazard on Kīlauea, but directly 
proportional on Mauna Loa. The number of responses in Kīlauea’s highest hazard zone (Zone 1) 
was 8 (3.2%), Kīlauea’s moderate zone (Zone 2) was 53 (21.2%), and Kīlauea’s lowest zone (Zone 
3) was 148 (49.3%). The numbers of responses in Mauna Loa’s highest hazard zone (Zones 1 and 
2) was 52 (20.8%), Mauna Loa’s moderate zone (Zone 3) was 72 (24%), and Mauna Loa’s lowest 
zone (Zones 4 and 6) was 39 (15.6%). Table 3.1 highlights the direct and indirect response rate 
proportions for Kīlauea and Mauna Loa and their corresponding hazard zones. The study was 
approved by the ETSU Institutional Review Board (#c0117.9sd). 
Table 3.1: Comparison of survey return rates on Kīlauea and Mauna Loa by lava flow hazard zone. 
 Lava Flow Hazard Zone Total 
 1 & 2 (ML*) & 1 
(KL*)  (high); N 
(%) 
3 (ML) & 3 (KL) 
(moderate) 
N (%) 
3 (KL) & 4 & 6 
(ML) (low) 
N (%) 
 
Kīlauea 8 (2.2) 53 (14.2) 148 (39.8) 209  
Mauna 
Loa 
52 (14.0) 72 (19.4) 39 (10.5) 163 
Total 60 (16.2) 125 (33.6) 187 (50.3) 372 
* ML= Mauna Loa; KL= Kīlauea 
3.2 Measures.  
3.2.1 Dependent variables. The questionnaire contained two items that measured respondents’ 
perceptions of two very different mitigation strategies that involve the use of: 1) bombs and 
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blasting and 2) barriers (i.e., berms) or trenches. Limited space prevented us from asking questions 
about the use of water, but we characterize the two sets of mitigation measures into attributes that 
make them beneficial (i.e., benefit-related attributes—a, b, and c below) versus those that are 
associated with costs (i.e., cost-related attributes—d through h below). We closed the questions by 
asking if either of the two mitigation methods were something they would support (i below). 
Respondents were asked: “To what extent would diverting lava flows by bombing or blasting” and 
“To what extent would diverting lava flows by constructing earthen berms or trenches”: 
a) protect persons very effectively;  
b) protect property very effectively;  
c) also be useful for purposes other than volcano protection;  
d) cost a lot of money;  
e) create other problems such as lawsuits;  
f) require specialized knowledge and skill;  
g) require a lot of effort;  
h) require a lot of cooperation from others;  
i) be something you would support?”  
The items were all anchored by a five-point Likert scale ranging from “Not at all” (= 1) to “Very 
great extent” (=5). To help understand public opinion about various mitigation strategies and 
mitigation towards specific critical infrastructure and people’s acceptance of additional risk to 
personal property to help protect important elements of their community, respondents were asked: 
“To what extent would you accept some increased risk to your home if authorities tried to divert a 
lava flow from a(n): 
a) school;  
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b) major road;  
c) electric substation;  
d) shopping center?”  
Again, the items were all anchored by a five-point Likert scale ranging from “Not at all” (= 1) to 
“Very great extent” (=5). A multi-item scale with an internal consistency reliability of Cronbach’s 
α = .92 was created for each respondent by computing the mean scores across the four sub-items 
(school, major road, electric substation, and shopping center). These four items were included in 
the measure because of their importance during the 2014 lava flow crisis. 
3.2.2 Independent variables. Respondents rated five stakeholder groups—federal, state, and 
local agencies; news media; state and local elected officials; peers; and their immediate family—
with respect to three characteristics. These were 1) hazard expertise: “To what extent do you think 
the following individuals or organizations are knowledgeable about Kīlauea [Mauna Loa] lava 
flows?”; 2) trustworthiness: “To what extent do you think each of the following is willing to 
provide you with accurate information about Kīlauea [Mauna Loa] lava flows?”; and 3) protection 
responsibility: “To what extent do you think each of following is responsible for protecting you 
from Kīlauea [Mauna Loa] lava flows?” The items were all anchored by a five-point Likert scale 
from “Not at all” (=1) to “Very great extent” (=5). Based on the results of a factor analysis that 
identified five factors, three scales were created using the mean scores of stakeholders (federal, 
state, and local agencies, state and local elected officials) based on their perceived: a) 
trustworthiness (α = .91); b) expertise (α = .92); and c) protection responsibility (α = .95). In 
addition, two scales were created using the mean scores of: d) news media based on their perceived 
trustworthiness and expertise (α = .74) and e) the respondents themselves, their immediate family, 
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and their peers based on their perceived trustworthiness, expertise, and protection responsibility 
(α = .82).  
Respondents were also asked to indicate their confidence in four aspects of warnings and 
response to future volcanic activity: “How likely do you think it is that each of the following will 
happen after a lava flow begins but before your home is threatened: a) you will receive an accurate 
forecast of lava arrival time, b) you will receive an official evacuation warning, c) you can prepare 
to evacuate, and d) you can prepare to evacuate to a safe location?” These items were all anchored 
by a five-point Likert scale from “Extremely unlikely” (=1) to “Extremely likely” (=5) and 
averaged to create a scale with α = .87.  
Additionally, people’s perceptions of the accuracy of previous lava flow forecasts at Kīlauea 
and future forecasts at Mauna Loa were evaluated by asking the Kīlauea sample: “How accurate 
do you think the lava flow forecasts during the June 2014-2015 lava flow crisis in Puna were with 
respect to...” For the Mauna Loa sample, we asked: “How accurate do you think lava flow forecasts 
will be during any future eruption of Mauna Loa with respect to…” Referents were: a) locations 
to be affected, b) amount of lava expected at those locations and c) time at which lava would arrive 
at those locations. A scale with α = .90 was constructed by computing the mean scores for the 
three referents.  
To assess respondents’ demographic characteristics, respondents were asked their marital 
status: married, single, divorced, or widowed, which was recoded to “married” (= 1) and “not 
married” (= 0). Respondents were also asked, “How many people in your household are: Less than 
18 years, 18-65 years, over 65 years” (for subsequent analyses, the total number of people in the 
household was used rather than by age group). Respondents were asked to describe their yearly 
household income before taxes: less than $25,000 (= 1), $25,001-$50,000 (= 2), $50,001-$75,000 
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(= 3), $75, 001-$100,000 (= 4), or over $100,000 (= 5). The respondents’ highest level of education 
was also assessed: elementary school (grades 1-6 = 1), Junior High or Middle School (grades 7-8 
= 2), High School (grades 9-12 = 3), College Degree (2 or 4 year degree = 4), or Graduate Degree 
(Masters, Ph.D., etc. = 5).  
3.3 Statistical Analysis. Paired sample t-tests were used to assess the differences between 
perceptions of bombing/blasting and earthen berms/trenches as mitigation measures. Pearson 
correlations were used to assess the degree of association among the independent and dependent 
variables. The experiment-wise error rate was controlled by setting a conservative significance 
level of p ≤ .01. All analyses were conducted in SPSS Version 23 and ArcGIS.  
4. Results 
4.1 Differences between perceptions of bombing/blasting and earthen berms/trenches. Table 
3.2 shows the mean ratings and standard deviations for the different items described in Section 
3.2.1. With respect to protecting person and property very effectively, respondents rated 
berms/trenches higher then bombing/blasting (t393 = -9.28, p < .01; t393 = -10.00, p < .01, 
respectively). Respondents’ also rated berms/trenches higher than bombing/blasting for being 
useful for purposes other than volcano protection (t382 = -10.18, p < .01) and something they would 
support (t392 = -9.40, p < .01). With regards to creating problems such as lawsuits and requiring 
specialized knowledge or skill, respondents rated bombing/blasting higher than earthen 
berms/trenches (t395 = 4.92, p < .01; (t396 = 5.07, p < .01, respectively). There were no significant 
differences on cost, effort, and cooperation.  
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Table 3.2. Mean ratings for beliefs, attitudes towards bombing/blasting and berms/trenches (Mean ± 
SD) 
Note: Bolded text denotes a significant difference 
 Bombing/blasting Berms/trenches 
Benefit-related attributes (1-3) 
1. protect persons very effectively 1.84 ± 1.13 2.37 ± 1.23 
2. protect property very effectively  1.84 ± 1.09 2.39 ± 1.22 
3. also be useful for purposes other than 
volcano protection 
Cost-related attributes (4-8) 
1.71 ± 1.07 2.35 ± 1.25 
4. cost a lot of money 3.86 ± 1.38 3.74 ± 1.24 
5. create other problems such as lawsuits 3.95 ± 1.33  3.64 ± 1.31  
6. require specialized knowledge and skill 4.25 ± 1.25  3.96 ± 1.20  
7. require a lot of effort 3.94 ± 1.33 4.01 ± 1.18 
8. require a lot of cooperation from others 4.18 ± 1.25 4.09 ± 1.16 
9. be something you would support 2.15 ± 1.38 2.81 ± 1.48 
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 4.2 Correlation analysis.  
4.2.1 Correlations among attributes.  As indicated in Table 3.3 below, there were strong 
positive correlations among the three benefit-related attributes (i.e., protect persons effectively, 
protect property effectively, useful for other purposes) for both bombing/blasting (average r = .77) 
and berms/trenches (average r = .73). In addition, there were also strong positive correlations 
among the cost-related attributes (i.e., cost a lot of money, create other problems, require 
specialized knowledge, require a lot of effort, and require a lot of cooperation) for both 
bombing/blasting (average r = .70) and berms/trenches (average r = .71). Moreover, there were 
strong positive correlations among the three benefit-related attributes for bombing/blasting with 
those for berms/trenches (average r = .27) and strong positive correlations among the five cost-
related attributes for bombing/blasting with those for berms/trenches (average r = .63). Finally, the 
correlations of three benefit-related attributes with support for bombing/blasting (average r = .60) 
and berms/trenches (average r = .62) were much larger than the corresponding correlations of the 
five cost-related attributes (average r = .18 and .24, respectively). 
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Table 3.3. Means (M), Standard deviations (SD), and correlations (rij) among variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Married 0.59 0.50 -              
2. HHSize 2.24 1.15 .33 -             
3. Ethnicity 0.63 0.43 -.03 -.19 -            
4. Income 2.56 1.30 .37 .20 .00 -           
5. Education 3.89 0.74 .04 -.06 .13 .26 -          
6. GovTrust 3.97 0.95 -.01 .07 .01 .02 -.06 -         
7. GovtExpert 3.82 0.94 .06 .08 -.05 -.01 -.09 .71 -        
8. GovProResp 3.53 1.34 .06 .09 -.16 .02 -.07 .40 .41 -       
9. NewsExpTr 3.70 1.03 .01 .08 -.13 -.05 -.16 .74 .78 .42 -      
10. Self/peers 3.56 0.95 .04 .11 -.12 -.03 -.12 .54 .50 .45 .54 -     
11. WarnConf 4.05 1.00 .07 .00 .04 .05 -.05 .55 .61 .31 .54 .34 -    
12. ForAcc 3.39 1.11 -.00 .04 .02 .03 -.08 .44 .46 .24 .41 .28 .48 -   
13. HazAdj 1.10 0.18 .03 .01 .01 .02 -.02 .02 .05 .12 -.01 .09 .07 .04 -  
14. HazZone 2.07 1.03 -.04 .03 .02 -.08 -.06 .11 .14 -.01 .11 .08 .15 .19 .09 - 
15. bombing_1pers 1.84 1.13 -.05 .11 -.10 .03 -.05 .12 .14 .22 .16 .13 .12 .13 .01 -.02 
16. bombing_2prop 1.84 1.09 -.01 .11 -.07 .07 -.02 .11 .13 .21 .16 .11 .11 .12 .02 -.04 
17. bombing_3useful 1.71 1.07 -.04 .13 -.09 .04 -.00 .12 .21 .19 .22 .19 .08 .15 .02 .02 
18. bombing_4cost 3.86 1.38 .03 -.04 -.11 -.11 -.05 .18 .18 .08 .20 .26 .10 .08 .05 .06 
19. bombing_5law 3.95 1.33 .04 -.08 -.04 -.06 .00 .23 .24 .11 .19 .22 .13 .12 .03 .08 
20. bombing_6skill 4.25 1.25 .04 -.05 -.01 -.02 -.03 .25 .23 .14 .24 .26 .17 .15 -.05 .07 
21. bombing_7effort 3.94 1.33 .05 -.06 -.05 .01 .04 .20 .17 .15 .17 .22 .16 .09 .02 .04 
22. bombing_8coop 4.18 1.25 .04 -.05 -.01 -.05 .01 .21 .19 .13 .20 .24 .14 .12 -.01 .00 
23. bombing_9supp 2.15 1.38 -.01 .07 .01 .01 -.12 .06 .08 .17 .12 .10 .06 .10 -.01 -.03 
24. berms_1pers 2.37 1.23 -.02 .08 -.01 -.01 -.03 .18 .22 .16 .23 .19 .18 .21 .06 .06 
25. berms_2prop 2.39 1.22 .00 .07 .03 .01 -.03 .19 .21 .15 .21 .18 .18 .22 .06 .07 
26. berms_3useful 2.35 1.25 -.08 .09 -.04 -.06 -.05 .13 .18 .13 .19 .22 .10 .19 -.01 -.05 
27. berms_4cost 3.74 1.24 -.04 .05 -.08 -.09 -.04 .17 .18 .12 .18 .15 .10 -.04 .06 -.08 
28. berms_5law 3.64 1.31 .00 -.03 -.01 -.05 .01 .14 .20 .22 .18 .15 .14 .04 .08 -.01 
29. berms_6skill 3.96 1.20 -.02 -.01 -.06 -.03 .06 .15 .20 .22 .17 .19 .09 .05 .08 -.09 
30. berms_7effort 4.01 1.18 -.06 -.01 -.04 -.06 .03 .16 .19 .18 .16 .16 .09 .01 .06 -.12 
31. berms_8coop 4.09 1.16 -.05 -.05 -.02 -.06 .03 .17 .21 .16 .16 .17 .13 .07 .07 -.09 
32. berms_9supp 2.81 1.48 -.02 .05 .07 -.05 -.11 .13 .16 .09 .18 .19 .12 .16 .00 .04 
33. divertprot 2.29 1.26 -.07 .06 -.16 -.03 -.07 .08 .10 .08 .14 .10 .07 .07 .04 -.07 
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Correlations in bold are significant at p < .01 
Note: 390 ≤ N ≤ 421. Married (Married=1; Not married=0), HHSize = Household size, Ethnicity (White = 1; Other = 0), Income (Less than $25,000=1; $25,001-
$50,000=2; $50,001-$75,000=3; $75,001-$100,000=4; Over $100,000=5), Education (elementary school (grades 1-6) = 1, Junior High or Middle School (grades 
7-8) =2, High School (grades 9-12) = 3, College Degree (2 or 4 year degree) = 4, or Graduate Degree (Masters, Ph.D., etc.) = 5, GovtTrust = Agency and officials 
trustworthiness, GovtExpert = Agency and officials expertise, GovProResp = Agency and officials protection responsibility, NewsExpTr = News media expertise 
and trustworthiness, Self/peers = Self and peers expertise, trustworthiness, and protection responsibility, WarnConf = Warning confidence, ForAcc = Past/future 
forecast accuracy, HazAdj= Overall hazard adjustment,  HazZone=hazard zone (1= high, 2=moderate, 3=low), bombing_1pers = protect persons very effectively, 
bombing_2prop = protect property very effectively, bombing_4useful = useful for purposes other than volcano protection, bombing_4cost = cost a lot of money, 
bombing_5law= create other problems such as lawsuits, bombing_6skill= require specialized knowledge and skill, bombing_7effort= require a lot of effort, 
bombing_8coop= require a lot of cooperation from others, bombing_9supp= be something you would support, berms_1pers = protect persons very effectively, 
berms_2prop = protect property very effectively, berms_4useful = useful for purposes other than volcano protection, berms_4cost = cost a lot of money, 
berms_5law= create other problems such as lawsuits, berms_6skill= require specialized knowledge and skill, berms_7effort= require a lot of effort, berms_8coop= 
require a lot of cooperation from others, berms_9supp= be something you would support, diverprot= willingness to accept some increased risk to protect critical 
facilities (school, major road, electric substation, or shopping center).
Variable 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
15. bombing_1pers -                  
16. bombing_2prop .92 -                 
17. bombing_3useful .67 .71 -                
18. bombing_4cost -.08 -.01 .03 -               
19.bombing_5law -.14 -.14 -.07 .72 -              
20. bombing_6skill .10 .09 .08 .61 .68 -             
21. bombing_7effort .00 -.01 .04 .65 .65 .73 -            
22. bombing_8coop .06 .05 .05 .65 .70 .80 .78 -           
23. bombing_9supp .70 .74 .56 -.14 -.19 .09 -.01 .06 -            
24. berms_1pers .58 .56 .49 .05 -.01 .14 .06 .11 .49 -         
25. berms_2prop .55 .58 .46 .04 .02 .16 .06 .12 .46 .93 -        
26. berms_3use .41 .43 .50 .12 .04 .17 .07 .13 .36 .64 .62 -       
27. berms_4cost -.01 -.02 .03 .52 .43 .41 .46 .46 0.01 .02 .01 .03 -      
28. berms_5law -.08 -.08 -.07 .40 .49 .36 .40 .44 -.10 -.01 -.02 .01 .71 -     
29. berms_6skill .01 .01 .04 .42 .41 .51 .49 .53 -.02 .09 .06 .15 .68 .63 -    
30. berms_7effort -.02 -.02 -.03 .48 .43 .51 .54 .56 -.06 .05 .04 .09 .73 .63 .83 -   
31. berms_8coop -.01 -.02 0 .48 .49 .53 .56 .63 -.02 .11 .10 .10 .66 .63 .78 .85 -  
32. berms_9supp .49 .52 .40 .01 -.05 .16 .08 .12 .58 .74 .73 .58 -.02 -.10 .06 .07 .13 - 
33. divertprot .18 .17 .21 -.08 -.05 .02 .04 -.05 .18 .20 .15 .27 .05 .03 .03 .08 .06 .21 
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4.2.2 Bombing/Blasting. Only two of the independent variables—government protection 
responsibility and news media expertise/trust—had consistently significant correlations with the 
three benefit-related attributes of bombing/blasting (average r = 0.19). However, four of the 
independent variables— government trust, government expertise, news media expertise/trust, and 
self/peers— had consistently significant (positive) correlations with the five cost-related attributes 
of bombing/blasting, but the correlations were relatively weak. None of the variables for 
perceptions of stakeholders had a significant correlation with support for bombing/blasting. Only 
one of the benefit-related attributes— usefulness for purposes other than volcano protection— had 
a significant correlation with forecasting accuracy (r = 0.15). And only one of the cost-related 
attributes— the requirement for specialized knowledge or skill, had a significant correlation with 
forecasting accuracy (r = 0.15). Forecasting accuracy had no significant correlation with support 
for mitigation measures. It is interesting to note that warning confidence had significant but weak 
correlations with three of the cost-related attributes (average r = 0.15) but no significant 
correlations with the benefit-related attributes. None of the socio-demographic variables had 
significant correlations with any perceptions of bombing/blasting. What was most noteworthy was 
that the stronger significant correlations with support for bombing/blasting were with all three 
benefit-related attributes. The mean for the benefit-related attributes was significantly lower (1.80 
± 1.02) than the cost-related attributes (4.04 ± 1.13) (Fig. 3.4).  
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Figure 3.4: Mean response ratings for the benefit-related and cost-related attributes for both bombs and 
berms. Figure also shows mean response ratings for support of both bombs and berms.   
4.2.3 Earthen berms/trenches. Four of the independent variables— government expertise, 
government protection responsibility, news media expertise/trust, and self/peers— had 
consistently significant [positive] correlations with the three benefit-related attributes of 
berms/trenches. Four of the independent variables— government trust, government expertise, 
news media expertise/trust, and self/peers— had consistently significant correlations with the five 
cost-related attributes of berms/trenches.  It was interesting to note that while stakeholder 
perceptions had no significant correlations with the support for bombing/blasting, three of these 
variables—government expertise, news media trust/expertise, and self/peers— had significant 
correlations with the support for earthen berms/trenches. Forecasting accuracy was significantly 
correlated with all three benefit-related attributes (r = 0.21, r = 0.22, and r = 0.19, respectively). 
Forecasting accuracy had no significant correlation with any of the cost-related attributes but a 
relatively weak correlation with support (r = 0.16). Confidence in warnings had significant weak 
correlations with two of the benefit-related attributes, protecting persons and property effectively 
1.8
2.37
4.04 3.9
2.15
2.81
1 
= 
"N
ot
 a
tl 
al
l" 
to
 5
 =
 "V
er
y g
re
at
 e
xt
en
t"
 88 
(r = 0.18). It was interesting to find that warning confidence had significant correlations with two 
of the cost-related attributes— creating other problems such as lawsuits (r = 0.14) and requiring a 
lot of cooperation (r = 0.13). None of the socio-demographic variables had significant correlations 
with any perceptions of earthen berms/trenches. What is most noteworthy is all three benefit-
related attributes regarding earthen berms/trenches had significant correlations with support (r = 
0.74, r = 0.73, and r = 0.58, respectively). The mean for the benefit-related attributes was 
significantly lower (2.37 ± 1.11) than the cost-related attributes (3.90 ± 1.07) (Fig. 3.4). 
4.2.4 Diversion to protect critical facilities. Only one of the independent variables— news 
media expertise/trust— had a significant correlation with acceptance of diversion and some 
increased risk (r = 0.14). None of the socio-demographic variables, forecasting accuracy, and 
warning confidence had significant correlations with any perceptions of diversion acceptance. 
Respondents’ willingness to accept some increased risk to protect critical facilities (i.e. school, 
major road, electric substation, or shopping center) was significantly correlated with the three 
benefit-related attributes for bombing/blasting as well as earthen berms/trenches. As expected, 
support for both mitigation measures were significantly correlated with willingness to accept some 
increased risk (r = 0.18 and r = 0.21, respectively). The mean response rating for respondents 
willingness to accept increased risk was higher than the overall mean (2.29 ± 1.26) for major road 
(2.56 ± 1.49), electrical substation (2.34 ± 1.40) (Fig. 3.5), and schools (2.30 ± 1.42), but not for 
shopping centers (1.93 ± 1.30). However, even these two means were below the neutral point in 
the rating scale (“3”) and given standard deviation the difference is not significant. What is most 
interesting to note is the proportion of respondents’ that were willing to accept, to varying degrees, 
some additional risk to their property compared to the respondents’ that were not willing to accept 
any additional risk was the highest for protecting major roads (0.62 vs. 0.38), electric substations 
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(0.58 vs. 0.42), schools (0.55 vs. 0.45). Shopping centers had the lowest proportion of respondents’ 
that were willing to accept compared to the respondents’ that were not willing to accept any 
additional risk to their own property (0.42 vs. 0.58).  
 
Figure 3.5: Chart showing the mean response ratings for the three critical infrastructural elements, plus 
commercial shopping center. 
4.3 Regression analysis. Results from the regression analysis are presented in Table 3.4, the 
left panel of which presents the results from regressing the support for bombing/blasting as a 
mitigation measure onto its perceived characteristics (Variables 14-21 in correlation analysis). The 
only significant predictors were perceived effectiveness to protect property and other problems 
created such as lawsuits. This produced b= 0.69, SE(b) = 0.11, β = 0.54, t = 6.00, p < .000, and b 
= -0.23, SE(b) = 0.06, β = -.22, t = -3.82, p < .000, respectively. This analysis produced an R2 = 
0.58, adjusted R2 = 0.57, F1,376 = 63.87, p < .000. The second panel of Table 3.4 shows results from 
regressing the support for earthen berms/trenches as a mitigation measure onto its perceived 
characteristics (Variables 23-30 in correlation analysis). The significant predictors were perceived 
effectiveness to protect persons and property, usefulness for purposes other than volcano 
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protection, and other problems created such as lawsuits. Model 2 produced a R2 = 0.62, adjusted 
R2 = 0.61, F1,380 = 74.56, p < .000.  
Table 3.4. Regression analysis results. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
 b SE Beta t Sig. b SE Beta t Sig. 
Protect persons 
effectively .08 .11 .07 .79 .43 .44 .11 .37 4.21 .00 
Protect property very 
effectively  .69 .11 .54 6.00 .00 .34 .10 .29 3.25 .00 
Useful for other 
purposes .15 .06 .12 2.41 .02 .19 .05 .16 3.79 .00 
Cost a lot of money -.08 .05 -.08 -1.41 .16 -.00 .06 -.00 -.03 .97 
Create other problems 
(lawsuits) -.23 .06 -.22 -3.82 .00 -.24 .06 -.21 -4.33 .00 
Specialized 
knowledge .07 .07 .07 1.10 .27 -.09 .07 -.08 -1.19 .24 
Lot of effort 
 .07 .06 .07 1.14 .25 .14 .10 .12 1.49 .14 
Lot of cooperation  
 .13 .07 .07 1.77 .08 .17 .09 .13 1.98 .05 
Constant .53 .19  2.78 .00 .46 .20  2.29 .02 
 
R2 =.58; 
Adjusted R2 = .57; 
F = 63.87; 
Degrees of freedom = 376 
R2 =.62; 
Adjusted R2 = .61; 
F = 74.56; 
Degrees of freedom = 380 
 
5. Discussion 
5.1 Benefit- and cost-related attributes. In general, respondents do not seem to think that either 
mitigation measure will be beneficial and will require many resources, more so for 
bombing/blasting than for earthen berms/trenches. Many of the strongest correlations are between 
the benefit-related attributes for these mitigation measures and the support for those measures. The 
rationale for weak correlations of support with the benefit-related attributes for both mitigation 
measures is related to recent events— after Tropical Storm Iselle and the June 2014-15 lava crisis, 
residents were not ready to deal with the renewed threat of electric power loss. When the lava flow 
crisis began in 2014, residents demanded from elected and appointed officials during community 
meetings that roads, internet, cell-phone and electricity be maintained. This may have proved to 
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be an important factor in the way residents viewed some subsequent lava flow mitigation actions 
carried out during the eruption in 2014.The benefit-related attributes were also the most significant 
variables in both models used in an attempt to predict support for lava mitigation measures. Upon 
further examination though, the benefit-related attributes for bombing/blasting have significant 
relationships with stakeholder characteristics. Specifically, the perception of government 
protection responsibility, as well as trust and expertise, and the correlation with the effectiveness 
to protect property and persons effectively. But what is most interesting is the correlation between 
bombing being something people would support and bombs protecting property and people—
which is much stronger than the corresponding correlation for earthen berms/trenches. This 
surprising result suggests that people think bombing could prevent the lava from even being near 
them whereas they think if earthen berms/trenches are used then the lava is already near them. This 
could potentially reflect their recent experience with Kīlauea. People might have thought Pu‘u‘Ō‘ō 
could be bombed causing the lava to flow back south toward the ocean (avoiding lower Puna) or 
they could have thought bombing would stop the eruption. Another possibility is that they realized 
bombing the lava near the source could make the flow restart its path toward Pāhoa and that maybe 
the eruption would end before the front reached near them again. According to Hawai‘i State Civil 
Defense (2002) lava diversion barriers are to redirect, not halt, lava flows around a community or 
critical infrastructure and therefore, barriers and bombing would have the same effect on diverting 
lava. Like Gregg et al. (2008), this study found that socio-demographic variables did not have a 
significant relationship with perceptions of bombing/blasting. Moreover, this study supported the 
issues identified in the State of Hawai‘i Lava Flow Hazard Technical Committee report (Hawai‘i 
State Civil Defense, 2002), which specifically highlighted the concern about liability and funding 
 92 
by finding a significant negative correlation with support. However, this relationship was only 
found for bombing/blasting, not for berms/barriers.  
5.2 Acceptance of additional risk when diverting lava to protect critical facilities. News media 
trust and expertise was the only variable that had a significant correlation with diversion 
acceptance. Perceptions of trust and expertise of the news media were also correlated with the 
three benefit-related attributes for bombing/blasting as well as earthen berms/trenches. So, it is not 
surprising that the people who thought bombs and barriers could protect people and property were 
more likely to accept some additional risk when diverting or bombing lava to protect critical 
facilities. What is interesting is that, while significant, there is not a strong correlation between 
support for bombing or barriers and acceptance of additional risk to save critical facilities. The 
strongest correlation was with the perception that bombing/blasting could be useful for purposes 
other than volcano protection. Perhaps the most interesting finding from this question is that 
respondents were more willing to accept some increased risk to their property to protect a major 
road, electric substation, and schools, but not shopping centers. This is consistent with people’s 
acceptance of HELCO’s responses to Tropical Storm Iselle and the June 2014-15 lava crisis, the 
latter of which threatened to isolate part of the Puna district and force the closure of both public 
and private schools. This suggests respondents view roads, electrical substations, and schools as 
critical infrastructure but do not view shopping centers as critical. Although the largest grocery 
store in the Puna district was threatened by the June 2014-15 lava flow, there was another market 
in a nearby town that would allowed residents’ access to important commercial goods. On average, 
respondents’ were not willing to accept a lot of risk to protect any of the four critical elements in 
this study. But they were more likely to accept some for protection of major roads, electrical 
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substations, and schools. This suggests that residents’ are willing to accept some degree of risk to 
their own property if it means they can protect elements in their community that they deem critical.  
6. Conclusion 
In general, this study found the strongest correlation between benefit-related attributes of 
bombing/blasting and earthen berms/trenches and support for both mitigation measures. Overall, 
support for earthen berms/trenches as a mitigation strategy was higher than for bombs/blasting, 
which is consistent with the findings of Gregg et al (2008). It is unsurprising that people who 
support either mitigation effort were more likely to accept some additional risk to their property. 
In other words, respondents who are more supportive of either one of the mitigation measures are 
the ones that would be more willing to accept some additional risk to their property. In light of 
recent events (Tropical Storm Iselle and the June 2014-15 lava crisis) it makes sense that people 
were more likely to accept some increased risk to their property to protect a major road, electrical 
substations and schools. This study’s findings suggest that respondents’ will support lava diversion 
strategies if the strategies are viewed as beneficial and respondents’ are willing to accept some of 
the risk to their own property if it means the risk will allow them to protect elements in their 
community that they deem critical.  
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CHAPTER 4  
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The first study (described in Chapter 2) examined differences in people’s perceptions of 
themselves and their families, their peers, news media, elected officials, and government 
agencies regarding three characteristics—hazard expertise, trustworthiness, and protection 
responsibility, across areas of varying lava flow hazard at Kīlauea and Mauna Loa volcanoes. 
This study supports previous research indicating that people generally rely on themselves to 
protect their lives and property and have trusted experts from whom they can seek information 
while monitoring the onset of hazards such as lava flows (Birkmann et al. 2008; Lindell and 
Perry 2012; Apatu et al. 2015). Confidence in the timeliness and accuracy of lava flow forecasts 
will allow these residents to prepare for and take protective action when the need arises. 
Although government agencies should take care to avoid promoting excessively high levels of 
confidence in warnings and forecasts when current scientific and emergency management 
constraints cannot support such actions, they should also recognize that people understand that 
such forecasts are uncertain. Risk communication will be most effective if scientists describe the 
range of plausible outcomes, the reasons for the uncertainty in their forecasts, and update their 
forecasts on a regular schedule. 
In general, then first study also showed the relationship between respondents’ confidence in 
several events important in decision-making during emergencies. Evacuations were most 
significantly correlated with respondents’ past experience with lava forecasts. This supported 
previous findings— that past hazard experience has a significant influence on perceived 
confidence in warnings. The study also found that respondents’ community bondedness had a 
significant influence on their confidence in warnings and their perceptions of stakeholders.  
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The goal of the second study (Chapter 3) was to better understand public opinion about 
various mitigation strategies that have been used on the island and people’s acceptance of 
additional risk to personal property in exchange for helping protect important elements of their 
community, such as roads, electrical substations, schools, and shopping centers. We examined 
this issue with regards to the correlations of respondents’ perceptions of stakeholders, their past 
crisis experience, the lava flow hazard zone in which they live, their confidence in warnings, and 
their socio-demographic and cultural characteristics with their perceived characteristics of two 
common mitigation measures— berms/barriers and bombs. Several eruptions of Kīlauea and 
Mauna Loa over the last ca. 100 years provided island residents and agencies with abundant lava 
flow hazard experience. Earthen barriers, bombs and water have been the most common 
strategies used to date to mitigate lava flows and their impacts, but a variety of factors outlined 
by the State Lava Flow Hazard Technical Committee report (Hawaii State Civil Defense 2002) 
suggest that official barriers and bombs are unlikely to be used. And while there are certainly 
technical and feasibility considerations when diverting lava flows, the conclusion reached in the 
report is in part due to the widespread belief that Hawaiian people oppose interfering in the path 
of lava, so cultural sensitivity to mitigation is likely to prevent the use of lava mitigation 
strategies. But at Kīlauea in 2014, there were opposing voices over the use of diversion strategies 
(some supported it if it could be done, while others were adamantly against it). However, there 
was no public opposition to the actions of the Hawaiian Electric Light Company protecting the 
electrical grid. Overall, respondents supported earthen berms/trenches more than 
bombing/blasting and were more willing to accept some increased risk to protect major roads, 
electrical substations, and schools. 
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Future work will continue to improve resilience to eruptions through better understanding of 
hazard processes, such as emplacement of lava flows and perceptions and responses by the 
general population. Government officials charged with making decisions about whether 
evacuation is warranted must evaluate the risks of unnecessary or delayed evacuations. If they 
can make reliable predictions of how individuals and communities respond to information about 
the volcanic event and its hazards, along with information about protective actions, including 
evacuation in response to warnings, then they will be better prepared to balance those risks. 
Similarly, physical scientists have the chance to learn from stakeholders such as policy makers 
and residents regarding decision criteria and societal priorities, which may help guide priorities 
in how to reduce, treat, and communicate uncertainties.  
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